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From the Editor 
In the last three short months, CTFP has helped convene hundreds of CT 
professionals in several locations around the world.  Mongolia hosted the Asia Pacific 
Center’s regional Alumni Symposium, where participants critically explored the 21st 
century challenges of “Ungoverned Spaces: Physical and Virtual”.  Greeting us with 
traditional blue scarves and fermented mare’s milk, our gracious hosts made the 
conference a success both for pan-Asian CT network-building, and for deepening our 
understanding of Mongolia itself. 
The National Defense University held its annual “Kickoff” exercise, uniting incoming 
CTFP Fellows with alumni from the College for International Security Affairs (CISA).  
Participants took part in a strategic-level exercise aimed at examining violent non-state 
actors and the national policies that could be used to counter them.  Putting their 
experiences and education to the test, the incoming students found themselves up 
against a formidable Red Team comprised of CISA CTFP alumni. 
At each of these events, CT practitioners engage in dialogue about CT issues affecting 
the worldwide community. At CTX, we aim to dive more deeply into these issues, and call 
upon real-world experiences to improve and inform CT operational effectiveness.  As an 
example for readers considering submitting to us, Ronny Kristoffersen uses some of his first-
person experiences to offer lessons learned in his article, contributing to exactly what CTX 
seeks: a dialogue about better practices.  
Likewise, we very much want the overviews we publish to also generate dialogue.  
That is why we don’t just welcome, but encourage responses from any of our Algerian 
CTFP Fellows, or others with experience in the Maghreb, to this issue’s special section on 
Algeria.   
For that matter, to all of our Fellows: help us be the journal of record for operational 
knowledge.  Let’s help each other fill in the blanks, fine-tune the analyses, and flesh out 
the overviews with the “been there, did/saw/thought something different” observations 
you each may have.  Share your experience, and share your knowledge – we all still have 
much to learn. 
This CT network is growing – in numbers and in strength – and we remain at-the-ready 
to report on your successes and lessons learned.   
The Editors at CTX 
CTXEditor@gmail.com  
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Content Recon… a sneak peek 
 This issue opens with a report from the field by CTFP’s director, Dr. Dennis Walters, on coordination efforts in 
East Africa against the Lord’s Resistance Army.  “CTFP: In Action” exemplifies how we can leverage our international CT 
community on an ad-hoc basis to counter terrorism. 
 In “Bleeding for the Village”, Norwegian Coastal Ranger Officer Ronny Kristoffersen provides a  synopsis of his 
experiences in Afghanistan, challenging conventional wisdom about how to conduct COIN.  Incorporating his real-world 
perspective, he explains how CT practitioners could – and arguably should -- be tapping into existing cultural structures. 
 Many CTFP alumni may remember Dr. Sebastian L. v. Gorka, who hails from the National Defense University 
and, in this issue of CTX, adapts recent testimony to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee for an article entitled 
“Ten Years Later: Are We Winning the War?” In it he offers his insights about “disturbing truths” and real steps that 
should be taken in order for the U.S. and its allies to make lasting progress against Al Qaeda. 
 CTFP and other CT professionals hoping to better understand the challenges confronting Algeria and the 
Maghreb at large should appreciate this issue’s SECTION ON ALGERIA.  In it, U.S. Army Special Forces Major Rich Nessel 
outlines a history of Islamist and Islamic ideologies that have been influential in Algeria, including the strain that has 
given us today’s Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.   In this issue’s “The Moving Image”, Dr. Kalev I. Sepp draws out 
deeper messages regarding torture in Jean Lartéguy’s book-to-film adaptation “Lost Command,” and the uncannily 
prescient film, “Battle of Algiers”.  Without sacrificing reality for theory -- or conscience for approval -- George 
Lober walks us through the difficult topic of torture in “Ethics and Insights”.  Lastly, we asked Algeria expert Dr. 
Mohammed Hafez to compile a concise bibliography for CT professionals who want to catch up on how best to 
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Because of the joint efforts, the 
combat effectiveness of the LRA was 
greatly reduced, and it was denied 
freedom to maneuver in what had 
once been its stronghold. 
CTFP In Action: East African Alumni Take on the LRA  
by Dennis Walters          
If there is one thing we in the global combating-
terrorism community have learned from our 
adversaries, it is the power of the network.  The global 
reach and collective knowledge a network affords are 
excellent force multipliers.  In keeping with this 
understanding, many of our alumni are reconnecting 
with us and their counterparts in other countries with 
requests for assistance or to share lessons learned. 
So it came as no surprise 
when one of our African alumni 
contacted us and requested we 
assist him in gaining a broader 
understanding of regional efforts 
directed against the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA). We 
quickly canvassed our rolls for 
available subject matter experts 
and put the call out to our East 
African alumni.  We soon had a 
venue to hold our LRA working 
group thanks to the efforts of the U.S. Embassy in 
Kampala and its Ugandan staff.  A short list of CT 
experts in East Africa was soon compiled, and we began 
preparations for an in-depth look at the LRA and efforts 
to counter it. 
As we got further into our research, it was 
obvious a great deal of interest in the LRA had been 
stimulated when President Obama signed into law the 
Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern 
Uganda Recovery Act in May 2010.  This landmark 
legislation received broad support in the U.S. Congress 
with 65 senators and 201 representatives voting in 
favor.  It is no small wonder many Americans felt 
compelled to support legislation against a group as 
violent as the Lord’s Resistance Army: the child 
abductions and gender-based violence perpetrated by 
the LRA are infamous in East Africa. In general terms, 
the law 
makes it U.S. policy to 
support efforts “to protect 
civilians from the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, to apprehend 
or remove Joseph Kony and his 
top commanders from the battlefield in the continued 
absence of a negotiated solution, and to disarm and 
demobilize the remaining LRA fighters.”  It also requires 
President Obama to develop a comprehensive, 
multilateral strategy to protect civilians in central Africa 
from LRA attacks and take steps to permanently stop 
the rebel group’s violence.  Furthermore, it calls on the 
United States to increase humanitarian assistance to 
countries currently affected by LRA violence and to 
support economic recovery and transitional justice 
efforts in Uganda.  The language in the law was both 
ambitious and straightforward. 
In Kampala, we listened to representatives from 
South Sudan and Uganda describe their joint efforts to 
oust the LRA from the border regions between the two 
countries.  Their success was nothing short of 
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multinational counterterrorism operations.  Because of 
the joint efforts, the combat effectiveness of the LRA 
was greatly reduced, and it was denied freedom to 
maneuver in what had once been its stronghold.  
Current estimates put the strength of the LRA at only 
400 to 500 fighters, and it has been relegated to 
operating in and around a large national park in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
Given the greatly reduced strength of the LRA, 
we asked the working group’s participants where they 
ranked the LRA as a threat to the national security of 
their countries.  Not surprisingly, none of the countries 
ranked the LRA as the most dangerous threat.  Various 
regional disagreements, health concerns, and crime all 
ranked higher than the LRA. The representatives from 
the DRC did make it clear that they consider the LRA’s 
presence on their soil a regional problem and 
emphasized that they should not be expected to deal 
with it alone—a point with which all the participants 
readily agreed. 
With the LRA’s reduced combat effectiveness 
and other, more pressing regional concerns, it would 
seem the recent passage of the LRA Disarmament law in 
the United States is both late and unnecessary.  Not 
quite.  Any number of geopolitical problems in East 
Africa can be indirectly addressed through multinational 
cooperation directed against the LRA.  Greater 
cooperation at the tactical and operational levels can 
also foster greater cooperation at the strategic level.  
The CTFP alumni in East Africa are well positioned to 
help develop this cooperation. 
 
Dr. Dennis Walters is the Director of the Combating 
Terrorism Fellowship Program and is a former U.S. 
special operator.         
 
 
Gain recognition through CTX  for your international CT project:  
if you're endeavoring to leverage the CTFP network for your country's or organization's 
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Bleeding for the Village:  Success or Failure in the Hands of the Local Powerbrokers 
by Ronny Kristoffersen 
June 2007, Farjab Province, Afghanistan 
On a moonless night, I crested a hill on my way to check out the valley below for enemy forces. Suddenly, I 
came upon three Taliban fighters approximately 10 meters in front of me; they were apparently as surprised as I was. 
“Dresh!” (Pashto for “stop,”), I yelled. They responded instantly with a spattering of automatic fire. A bullet struck me 
in the shoulder and knocked me to the ground. Bleeding heavily and unable to quickly reach my rifle, I returned their 
fire with my pistol, as five other fighters began shooting at me from 75 meters away. As the bullets whined past my 
head, I thought, “Is this the end? Will I never see my wife or my children again?" Bleeding and in pain, I pulled my rifle, 
retreating slowly while returning their fire, killing two and injuring another. Soon my team members, hearing the 
firefight in the still night, reached me, and together, we defeated the rest of the Taliban fighters. I had looked death in 
the eye and survived. But because the skirmish had occurred in an unsecured, dangerous area, an instant medical 
evacuation was impossible, and we had no choice but to stay where we were for the night.  
Coastal Ranger Command—Military Observer Team “November” (MOT Navy), I am number four from the left. Without their skills 
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The village leader and… elders looked 
at me—the team leader… my uniform 
drenched in blood…—and the 
expression in their eyes reflected 
amazement, gratitude, and deep 
respect. 
  
My “bleeding for them”—their 
own terminology for such incidents—
ensured that our mission  
was a success. 
At dawn, in the relative safety of daylight, we 
traveled down to the village, where my second-in-command 
told the village leader, who was the brother of the 
governor, how we had saved the village from a Taliban 
attack. The village leader and the village elders looked at 
me—the team leader, obviously in pain, my uniform 
drenched in blood, resting in the car—and the expression in 
their eyes reflected amazement, gratitude, and deep 
respect. My “bleeding for them”—their own terminology 
for such incidents—ensured that our mission was a success. 
That mission, as part of Norway’s contribution to 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, 
had been to protect the village from a Taliban attack, which 
had been rumored to be planned for that night. This 
village was especially important because the family of the 
provincial governor, an influential local powerbroker, 
lived there. Our hope was that by protecting the village, 
we would gradually gain the trust and support of the 
governor,  his  family,  and the other villagers.  
What does this story tell us about 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations? Traditionally, 
scholars of COIN talk about “winning hearts and minds,” 
as part of a strategy centered on popularity. The key to 
success typically is to get the local population to move 
from supporting the insurgents to supporting the 
government. However, this episode illustrates how 
winning the support of the entire population may be 
unnecessary. Instead, this article will argue that 
counterinsurgency operations should focus on local 
leaders.  If these influential community members 
support the government, their followers will as well. 
Conversely, if they oppose the government, so too will 
their followers. This article focuses upon these leaders, who I identify as “local powerbrokers” (LPBs). 








 In other words, it is not necessary,  
and indeed may not be possible,  
to win support directly from  
local villagers. So far, it has proved  
far more effective to first win over 
their “controllers,” the LPBs. 
In most Afghan villages, a prominent member acts as the leader in the village shura, (council of respected 
leaders), and jirgas (council of the elders, tribal leaders, lineage leaders, or the heads of families).1 In some cases, he 
may be the current tribal elder, or he may be a former mujahedeen fighter. These men wield the influence necessary to 
gain villagers’ general acceptance of the coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan and so are the most important societal 
elements that the coalition needs to win over. The same is true for the Afghan government: to gain the support of local 
communities in the current fight against the Taliban, it must first gain the support and involvement of the local leaders.2 
If approached correctly and persuasively, these leaders will convince the majority of the population to 
cooperate with the coalition and Afghan government. In other words, it is not necessary, and indeed may not be 
possible, to win support directly from local villagers. So far, it has proved far more effective to first win over their 
“controllers,” the LPBs. Seth Jones says simply, “gaining the 
support of tribal and community leaders is critical.”3 Since the 
local leaders already hold much of the power today, it is virtually 
impossible to ignore or bypass them. Likewise, Noah Coburn finds 
that powerbrokers such as “warlords, local elders, maliks, and 
jihadi commanders”4 are the most important people to influence 
in order to reach local populations because they “tend to have a 
large amount of political control over communities.”5 
But what about strategy? How can U.S. coalition forces 
and the Afghan government win interest and support from LPBs? 
This article will show that the most effective strategy requires first 
having a clear understanding of the three elements that are most important to local tribal and village leaders: status, 
power, and legitimacy. If the counterinsurgency operation can enhance or threaten to deny any of these elements, 
which sometimes are interrelated, then it can influence the behavior of the local powerbrokers. By developing a 
strategy that combines positive and negative inducements, counterinsurgents can give LPBs the incentive to choose 
coalition and government forces over the Taliban and others. 
                                                          
1 Harvey Smith et al., Area Handbook for Afghanistan, 4th ed.  (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1973), 427. 
2 Anthony King, The Powerbrokers We Need Onside, (March 2, 2010), retrieved from Parliamentary Brief Online, 
http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/2010/03/the-powerbrokers-we-need-onside (accessed January 21, 2011). 
3 Seth Jones, e-mail correspondence, July 8, 2011. 
4 Noah Coburn, “Parliamentarians and Local Politics in Afghanistan: Elections and Instability II,” (September 2010,) 
retrieved from Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit website, 
http://www.areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=453&ContentId=7&ParentId=7 (accessed July 27, 2011), 10. 
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…to be most effective in influencing local leaders, 
a use of both “carrots and sticks” is necessary. 
If its efforts to win the trust 
and support of the Afghan people are 
to succeed, the government must put 
pressure on the district and village 
powerbrokers and show them there 
will be negative consequences if they join or support the Taliban. The process should not be one-sided, however, and 
the government must also show credibility and a willingness and commitment to fight the Taliban and all those who 
join and follow it. 
In other words, to be most effective in influencing local leaders, a use of both “carrots and sticks” is necessary. 
“Gaining the support of tribal and community leaders is critical. Historically, doing this effectively in Afghanistan has 
required both co-option and coercion—providing incentives to tribes and communities to support the government, 
and sticks to keep them in line,” Jones says.6 
Three Factors of Success 
Three important factors are involved in winning the trust and support of local powerbrokers: status, power, and 
legitimacy. Although all are intertwined, this article will address each factor separately to better show the variety of 
interactions among them. 
Status, or Respect for Authority 
The desire for and need to maintain respect and status are important motivations for Afghan powerbrokers. 
According to a U.S. handbook on Afghanistan, “Both tribalism and Islam have combined to make respect for authority 
basic to the value system. The tribal member is taught the supreme importance of showing proper respect to those 
who, because of their status, have the right to assert authority.”7 
Within a tribe, the man who has the highest status is the one who “is a member of the senior lineage, holds a 
recognized position of tribal authority, is the senior person in his family and lineage, and supports his status with 
wealth in animals and land, and a large group of well-armed men.”8 As the chosen village leader, or Malik, he “is the 
main channel of communications between the village and the central government.”9 Although the position of Malik is 
mostly hereditary, some flexibility is built into the system. If the Malik’s son proves to be incompetent or lacks the 
support of the villagers, for example, he can be replaced by someone else of high status.10 
                                                          
6 Seth Jones, e-mail correspondence, July 8, 2011. 
7 Smith et al., Area Handbook, 183. 
8 Smith et al., Area Handbook, 92. 
9 Smith et al., Area Handbook, 93. 
10 Noah Coburn, Quam: Conceptualizing Potters in the Afghan Political Arena, (September 2008), retrieved from The 








A local powerbroker 
must constantly prove himself 
worthy as the village Malik, or tribal 
leader…or he will be replaced by one 
of his ever-present competitors. 
In Afghan communities, having respect for a village leader is a matter governed by strict tribal codes, according 
to which the people recognize the necessity for and the legitimacy of the leader’s position. Many expect to be leaders 
themselves some day, when they too will demand total respect and obedience in keeping with their high status.11 
However, because tribal societies are basically egalitarian, with respect to the equal rights and privileges of all 
members, the leaders cannot base their power on their status alone.12 A leader must work continuously to convince the 
village that he has superior personal qualities, is able to procure and redistribute resources from outside the village, 
and can provide maximum security. If the villagers should become dissatisfied with the current Malik, they may decide 
to replace him.13 
Colonel Ralph O. Baker, former commander of the 2nd 
Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division, describes 
similar lessons learned in Iraq. He identifies “five groups of Iraqis 
that had considerable influence among the population: local 
Imams and priests, local and district council members, staff and 
faculty from the universities, Arab and international media, and 
local sheiks and tribal leaders.”14 By approaching the most trusted 
and influential community members as well as social and cultural 
leaders, he hoped to convince the silent majority to cooperate 
with the U.S. coalition. The sheiks and other local leaders wanted 
outside support for a variety of key issues—security, development, and justice. If they could get this support from the 
U.S forces, the tribal leaders, in keeping with the tribal system, would increase their status and earn respect as leaders 
in their villages. Therefore, in COIN operations, outside resources must be channeled through the village leaders in 
order to increase the LPBs' status among their population.  
Power 
“Power,” as defined by author Jeffrey Pfeffer, “involves the exercise of influence over others; leadership 
involving inducing a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and his or her followers.”15 
Thus, a tribal leader’s power is vitally important to him, and he will try at all times to maintain or increase his power. 
                                                          
11 Christine F. Ridout, “Authority Patterns and the Afghan Coup of 1973,” Middle East Journal 29, no. 2 (Spring 
1975): 166. 
12 Bernt Glatzer, “The Pashtun Tribal System,” in Concept of Tribal Society, ed. G. Pfeffer and D. K. Behera,  (New 
Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002), 272. 
13 Glatzer, Pashtun Tribal System, 272. 
14 Ralph O. Baker, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information 
Operations,” Military Review (May–June 2006): 22. 
15 Jeffrey Pfeffer, Managing with Power, Politics, and Influence in Organizations (Boston: Harvard Business School 
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Therefore, in COIN operations, outside resources must be channeled through the village 
leaders in order to increase the LPBs' status among their population. 
According to a 2002 study on the Pashtun tribal system by Bernt Glazer, “In a tribal setting a leader can gain 
power by (1) controlling tenants; (2) attracting many regular guests through lavish hospitality; (3) channeling resources 
from the outside world to one’s followers; (4) superior rhetoric qualities and regular sound judgment in the shuras and 
jirgas; and (5) gallantry in war and conflict.”16 A local powerbroker must constantly prove himself worthy as the village 
Malik, or tribal leader, Glazer says, or he will be replaced by one of his ever-present competitors.17 Throughout history, 
Afghan tribal leaders have contributed to what they perceive to be the most powerful military force in their area, and 
their support or lack of support for the kings has been crucial in maintaining national stability.  The power of the tribal 
leaders was not generally contested by the government in their territories; they, rather than the central government, 
commanded the loyalty of their followers.18 
The government’s dependence on tribal military support has declined as the Afghan National Army and Afghan 
National Police have increased in numbers, but tribal leaders continue to retain power in their respective 
communities.19 Thus, to retain the cooperation of the powerbrokers in local villages, the Afghan government often 
appoints the tribal leaders to leading positions in the districts. According to Brian Petit, “The villages usually provide 
their own security and governance within the larger and generationally volatile swings of central government. The 
village will accept the basic provision of security and justice as the mark of the ruling power,” thus, local powerbrokers 
gain personal power by providing security and justice to the village.20 So, today, “lineage is no longer the singular source 
of power; the central control and coordination of economic, military, and religious resources now matters 
increasingly,” writes David Ronfeldt.21 
Baker, the former commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, describes initiating weekly and biweekly 
meetings with local leaders in Iraq in order to discover what they wanted and listens to their complaints about what the 
Iraqis felt his unit was not doing well. That they were sought out and asked to shape Baker’s efforts made the local 
powerbrokers feel important. This newfound ability to obtain outside resources for their villages—such as electricity, 
                                                          
16 Glatzer, Pashtun Tribal System, 272. 
17 Glatzer, Pashtun Tribal System, 273. 
18 Smith et al., Area Handbook, 214. 
19 Smith et al., Area Handbook, 214. 
20 Brian Petit, “The Fight for the Village,” Military Review (May–June 2011), 31. 
21 David Ronfeldt, In Search of how Societies Work: Tribes—The First and Forever Form, (December 2006), retrieved 
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water, medicine, and freedom from criminality—resulted in their acquiring greater power and also greater respect in 
their communities.22 
Legitimacy 
According to John A. McCary’s description of Iraq, “each tribe is headed by a sheik, whose legitimacy is based 
on the ability to provide for his village, which engenders patronage to his will. … Once a tribal leader flips, attacks on 
American forces in that area stop almost overnight.” 23 If the government bypasses the local powerbrokers, they may 
undermine their legitimacy, but by involving and including the local powerbrokers in the local government instead of 
neglecting them, the government adds to the legitimacy of the LPBs, which gives them further incentive to choose to 
cooperate with the government. 
To understand how legitimacy in the Afghan tribal society works, it is important to know how the tribes are 
organized. Particularly in Pashtun tribal organizations, “jirga usually refers to either a council of the elders, tribal 
leaders, lineage leaders or the heads of families,”24 according to the Handbook. In his study of the war in Afghanistan, 
Sean R. Slaughter found that, “Jirgas enjoy strong legitimacy, particularly in the rural areas. With the lack of a strong 
central government and judiciary, jirgas became the only way to provide justice for the quam.”25 
The term quam can be defined in a 
variety of ways, including “‘tribe,' ‘people,' 
‘ethnic group,' ‘clan,' ‘lineage,' or even 
‘profession’ ”26 in different parts of 
Afghanistan. Together with lineage leaders, tribal elders, and local powerbrokers, the jirga can facilitate justice and 
legitimacy by using a local approach.27 The khan—“a Turkic word meaning ‘lord’ or ‘chief’ of a tribe or local component 
of a tribe,”28—has great social currency patronage in the village. “Khans, in short, traffic in patronage, respect, service, 
and influence, joining personal charisma to collective legitimacy in all their paradoxes and ambiguities,”29 according to 
Jon W. Anderson, and thus are important powerbrokers to influence.30 A khan must do things to deserve and retain his 
title; therefore, khans tend to seek ways to achieve even higher status and greater legitimacy. However, that pursuit of 
                                                          
22 Baker, “The Decisive Weapon.” 19. 
23 John A McCary, “The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives,” Washington Quarterly (January 2009), retrieved 
from The Washington Quarterly website, http://www.twq.com (accessed July 13, 2011), 46 and 52. 
24 Smith et al., Area Handbook, 427. 
25 Sean R. Slaughter, Expanding the Quam: Culturally Savvy Counterinsurgency and Nation-building in Afghanistan, 
(School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010), 33. 
26 Coburn, Quam: Conceptualizing Potters, 12. 
27 Jim Gant, “One Tribe at the Time,” http://www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/one_tribe_at_a_time_ed2.phpp (accessed 10.7.10), 26. 
28 Jon W. Anderson, “There are no Khans Anymore: Economic Development and Social Change in Tribal Afghanistan,” 
Middle East Journal 32, no. 2 (Spring 1978): 168. 
29 Anderson, “There are no Khans,” 170. 
30 Anderson, “There are no Khans,” 170. 
Once a tribal leader flips, attacks on American 
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status makes khans vulnerable to government exploitation, because the government can take advantage of them by 
giving them incentives to support the government.31 
It is the jirgas or shuras (councils) in local districts that are instrumental in enforcing the local laws.32 A local 
group called the Arbakai essentially functions as “a community police force; this group implements the local jirga’s 
decisions and has immunity for these decisions,” according to Seth G. Jones and Arturo Muñoz in their study, 
Afghanistan’s Local War.33 The Arbakai generally are most effective when legitimate local institutions, such as 
jirgas or shuras, establish them.34 
The second most widely practiced tribal code is that of the Hazara. In Hazara tribes, the Malik, the elected 
leader, performs the role that the jirgas do among Pashtun tribes,35 and in Tajik tribes, the Mullahs and the village 
government fill those roles.36 
In their study, Afghanistan’s Local War, Jones and Muñoz say that the Arbakai forces, together with an 
impending resurgence of warlords and the Afghan National Army and Police, will eventually comprise a legitimate 
official power structure that is able to give the population justice,37 and prevent local powerbrokers from joining the 
Taliban. However, if the local 
powerbrokers are not included in the 
establishment of the power 
structure, they will most likely desert 
their communities and join the 
Taliban in order to retain some form of power base. Therefore, the government must acknowledge the existing 
powerbrokers in local areas and include them in district governments. As Jones puts it: 
The current top-down state-building and counterinsurgency effort must take place alongside bottom-up 
programs, such as reaching out to legitimate local leaders to enlist them in providing security and services at 
the village and district levels. Otherwise, the Afghan government will lose the war.38 
                                                          
31 Anderson, “There are no Khans,” 170. 
32 Seth G. Jones and Arturo Muñoz, Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces (Santa Monica, Calif.: 
RAND, 2010); retrieved from the Rand National Defense Research Institute website, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1002.pdf (accessed February 24, 2011), 21. 
33 Jones and Muñoz, Afghanistan’s Local War, 27. 
34 Jones and Muñoz, Afghanistan’s Local War, 61. 
35 Smith et al, Area Handbook, 387. 
36 Smith et al, Area Handbook, 387. 
37 Jones and Muñoz, Afghanistan’s Local War, 61. 
38 Seth G. Jones, “It takes the Villages: Bringing Change from Below in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, (May 2010): 1. 
However, if the local powerbrokers are not included in 
the establishment of the power structure, they will most 
likely desert their communities and join the Taliban in 
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In Afghanistan, individuals normally respect authority, but their respect is given first and foremost to their tribal 
chief or head of family.39 Therefore, the cooperation of the local powerbrokers, which often is the tribal chief or village 
elder, is important for government forces to exercise legitimacy and authority. Moreover, it is critical that the 
government recognize the legitimacy of the local powerbrokers in order to gain their support. In turn, the 
government’s recognition of the power of the LPBs will increase the legitimacy of those men among the villagers, which 
provides a major motivation for these influential leaders to cooperate with the government. 
Case Study: “Bleeding” for Local Powerbrokers 
The Military Observation Team “November” (MOT Navy), which I led in 2007, consisted of seven Norwegian 
Coastal Rangers deployed to Meymaneh, Farjab Province, in northwest Afghanistan, where an ISAF Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) was based. We operated for weeks at a time primarily in three districts: Almar, Qaysar, and 
Ghormach, where the Taliban had not yet achieved a strong foothold. But Taliban activity was increasing during that 
time, and the most vulnerable district was Ghormach. In 2001, when the Northern Alliance defeated the Taliban, a 
                                                          
39 Smith et al, Area Handbook, 395. 
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Coalition officials assumed that 
life would automatically be better for 
the Afghans if there were no longer 
the threat of Taliban attacks. But, to 
the Afghans, a better life meant a 
reliable supply of electricity, food, 
medical care, jobs, and safety from 
criminals. 
number of Taliban fighters remained in Ghormach, a local safe haven. However, when my team arrived in the spring of 
2007, they existed only as a sort of “sleeper cell,” performing very few operations in the area. 
Our basic mission was broad and nonspecific, designed primarily as an intelligence gathering operation in this 
relatively small, largely unfamiliar area of Afghanistan. As with most missions aimed at acquiring dependable 
information about the Taliban’s increasing role in a particular neighborhood, our first challenge was to win the trust 
and confidence of local powerbrokers. As Dorothy Denning puts it, “brokers are in a powerful position to facilitate 
trust.”40 We soon realized that, while they were willing to talk with us, the LPBs shared little pertinent information 
because of a lack of trust. And it was obvious, also, that without the approval of their leaders, none of the villagers 
would provide any information either. We decided, therefore, to 
concentrate our efforts in the district where the threat from Taliban 
activity was the greatest: Qaysar. We also observed the same 
problem Col. Baker had seen in Iraq. Both Col. Baker in Iraq and my 
MOT in Afghanistan realized that the Afghans' expectations of a 
better and more secure life, as promised by ISAF, was different than 
what coalition envisioned. Coalition officials assumed that life would 
automatically be better for the Afghans if there were no longer the 
threat of Taliban attacks. But, to the Afghans, a better life meant a 
reliable supply of electricity, food, medical care, jobs, and safety 
from criminals. As we soon realized, if we were going to have any 
chance of success, the Afghans had to experience action from my 
team, either in the form of development or better security. Either 
way, we had to act, not only talk. 
Determining How to Meet Local Leaders’ Needs for Status, Power, and Legitimacy 
Operating on the premise that gaining cooperation from local leaders depended largely on demonstrating to 
them that their cooperation would increase or enhance their status, power, and legitimacy in their communities, my 
unit's first move was to initiate meetings with three of the influential groups involved: tribal leaders, other local 
powerbrokers, and the Afghan National Police. Our purpose was threefold: to find out what was happening in the area; 
to begin to build a sense of mutually beneficial cooperation; and, most of all, to make them feel that they were 
included, important, and powerful components of the decision-making process. We deliberately and publicly 
recognized the legitimacy of each local powerbroker, which seemed to have the desired effect. Our efforts made a 
strong impression on the villagers in general, thereby enhancing the status of the local leaders in their individual 
villages. However, we did not officially recognize one local powerbroker because intelligence reports pointed to his 
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involvement in criminal activity. This decision I now see as a mistake of my own. We should have recognized him 
because later it became obvious that he was a very important, influential powerbroker. 
In addition to increasing the legitimacy and status of the leaders by recognizing them as powerbrokers, I asked 
members of the three groups what kind of help the area needed and, more specifically, what assistance they thought 
my group, ISAF, or the Afghan government could provide. One of the first suggestions we acted on was from the Afghan 
National Police who requested money to build a defensive position on a hilltop so that they could better survey the 
area and defend the village from Taliban attack. Providing the finances to improve the village security served a double 
purpose: it demonstrated the village leader’s ability to procure outside resources; and because both the police, 
representing the Afghan government, and coalition forces were involved, it also reinforced the local powerbroker’s 
legitimacy. My team also benefited, as the villagers then began to approach us in a different way and to provide some 
dependable information about insurgent activity in the area. 
Another example of our success in enhancing the influence and position of a local powerbroker resulted from 
his request that we implement a medical vaccination and treatment operation. We brought in the necessary medical 
resources—doctors, equipment, and medicine—from the Meymaneh provincial reconstruction team. When the 
villagers realized that the medical operation would not have occurred without the efforts of their local leader, they 
changed their perception of his power and ability to beneficially affect their lives. The powerbroker’s status was 
increased, and he gained legitimacy as we publicly acknowledged his efforts and cooperated with him. The 
powerbroker himself told me later that we now had his and the village’s support “forever.” In some villages, we 
donated school supplies and school tents for the local leaders to distribute; in another, we gave the local powerbroker 
money to dig and build water wells employing local contractors. These efforts accomplished similar results: enhancing 
and increasing the status, power, and legitimacy of local leaders. 
In a similar way, Brian Petit explains how Afghan Maliks became responsive to U.S. coalition and governmental 
measures, such as the promise of local construction projects, representative shuras, and conflict resolution 
mechanisms.41 Petit gives the example of a special forces team’s sponsorship of some Afghan community elders, which 
provided them with the means to implement more than 55 small projects in their village cluster, at a total cost to the 
U.S coalition of $250,000,42 but of even higher value in their results. Being given the means and authority to implement 
the projects on their own, the villagers were galvanized against the insurgent encroachment, and the local 
                                                          
41 Petit, “The Fight for the Village,” 28. 
42 Petit, “The Fight for The Village,” 28. 
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powerbrokers increased their status within the communities because of their ability to gain such beneficial 
resources from outside the village. 
Becoming Powerbrokers 
In my primary area of responsibility (Almar and Qaysar districts), there were other military units acting together 
in joint operations. However, since it was officially my area, they all told the local communities that “Commander 
Ronny” had sent them. We initiated small, quick-development projects, all ordered and organized by “Commander 
Ronny,” and eventually, I became recognized throughout the area as a powerbroker. Local leaders of all kinds now 
knew me, had seen my ability to draw on outside resources, and viewed my role as team commander as a position of 
great power. For example, during a major intelligence-gathering operation, a local powerbroker approached one of the 
other teams with a request. Having observed the 
F-16 fighter planes that we used as operational 
over-watch, he asked; “Please tell Commander 
Ronny to spare our poppy fields from being 
bombed.” In response, the team leader told him 
that they would pass on his request to 
Commander Ronny, but he would be the one to 
make the decision. 
Eventually, instead of our going to the 
local leaders, they began coming to us, and since 
we usually posted on hilltops, especially at night, 
we were easy to find. We had successfully 
demonstrated that the powerbrokers’ 
cooperation with us was effective in increasing 
their own status, power, and legitimacy. Now 
they wanted me to come to a meeting to assist them with different issues, particularly village security. Thus, my own 
experience in Afghanistan convinced me that gaining the trust of local powerbrokers, and even becoming recognized as 
a powerbroker myself, greatly increased the possibility of mission success. It was when all those factors came together 
that I saw the greatest difference in the villagers' support. 
 
 




Vol. 1, No.2      CTX 
 
18 
“Bleeding” for the Protection of the Local People 
Our most effective operations in gaining the cooperation of the local powerbrokers and their communities 
occurred when we stood with them in fights against the Taliban. Those shared experiences showed me that the 
security of their villages was the most pressing concern of local leaders. I also learned that the local powerbrokers had 
long since grown tired of giving information to a government that then failed to act on it. It was a pattern we tried our 
best not to repeat and a lesson we tried not to forget. 
Another significant aspect to my team’s 
operations in Afghanistan was going into areas 
where few, if any, teams had gone before. This 
happened when a local leader from Sakh village 
reported that there might be Taliban training 
camps in the Sadhi Kham area. By approaching 
villages perceived as “dangerous” by the local 
people, we demonstrated that we took their 
leaders’ reports seriously, enhancing the status 
of those leaders. One meeting in a designated 
“dangerous” village particularly stands out 
because my interpreter, who came from 
Kabul, was terrified by the presence of 
several possible Taliban commanders, fearing for his life.  As a result of this meeting, I had a price placed on my 
head: a mere $10,000. 
One night, when we were back at the Meymaneh PRT camp, we received a phone call from the chief of police 
in a nearby village, asking that we come and help because he feared the Taliban was planning a night attack on his 
village. My team immediately made the five-hour drive to the village to help the chief of police and local powerbrokers. 
We took defensive positions on the roof of the police headquarters from where we could control the rest of the village. 
No attack came that night, but the response from the local powerbroker was overwhelming. He knew that if the Taliban 
took over his village, he would lose power; thus, he needed our help. After seeing that we were willing to fight for his 
village, he gave us his total support. 
The next day, we received orders from the PRT commander to go to the home village of the provincial governor 
because it was rumored that 50 Taliban fighters would attack that village during the night. The provincial governor, the 
most powerful and influential powerbroker in our area, came from the village of Senjetak Jinab, on the border of the 
northwestern Bagdis Province. His younger brother was in charge in the village since the governor lived mostly in 
Meymaneh; the younger brother also wielded a big influence on the nearby villages because of his brother’s 
high position. 





Vol. 1, No.2      CTX 
 
19 
 As one local leader told my second-in-command… 
“if you guys are willing to take a bullet for us, 
and are willing to die for us, why should we not 
trust you?” 
We went to the village, talked to the elders and the governor’s brother, and agreed that we would help them. 
People were ordered to stay inside during the night, and we prepared to fight the Taliban if they came. The village was 
difficult to defend because of surrounding hills, and we had to make some tough choices regarding our own security 
versus having the ability to oversee the entire village. That night, Taliban forces tried to ambush us, coming from an 
unexpected direction, and I was shot. 
But good things came from that incident, because by “bleeding for the village,” as the Afghans phrased it, we 
gained the total cooperation and support of the local powerbrokers. As one local leader told my second-in-command, 
the next time my team went into Senjetak village, “if you guys are willing to take a bullet for us, and are willing to die 
for us, why should we not trust you?”  The fact that we had defeated the attack and that “Commander Ronny” 
himself was injured made a huge impact on surrounding villages. The LPBs understood that by supporting the 
government, they would at the same time 
strengthen their own position and power, giving 
them extra incentive. 
 
Lessons Learned 
In Senjetak and other nearby villages, the villagers gave us their full support in the two months immediately 
following my wounding. No Taliban managed to get a foothold in the area, and the villagers gave us good information 
regarding Taliban activity in the area. 
Because of the good situation in those villages, military teams began to prioritize additional villages, meaning 
one or two months could often pass when no team was present in Senjetak or the villages nearby. After three months, 
therefore, these villages again started to show signs of hesitation about giving us information, and the LPBs no longer 
wanted to meet us. When my own unit’s team went to meet some elders in Tez Nawa, a village near Senjetak, they 
were caught in a deadly ambush that lasted for six hours. One Afghan army soldier was injured and had to be 
evacuated by helicopter. Before this attack, my team had always received information about possible ambushes from 
the LPBs, either by phone or in meetings, but this time there had been no “heads-up.” Later in the same area, a 
Norwegian soldier was killed in an IED attack, having received no information about the danger from local 
powerbrokers. Later, six of the eight MOT Navy team members were injured in another major ambush in the same 
valley where I had been wounded. More recently, in June 2009, a joint force consisting of 150 soldiers tried to get into 
the villages, but the Taliban proved too strong, and the joint force had to pull back. It has now become impossible for 
coalition forces to move into those villages where we once built a good relationship with the local leaders and won 
support from them and their people. 
Also, in one of the villages, ISAF and the government established an Arbakai force to protect their own village. 
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soldiers they would do the same to everyone who did not put down his weapons. Arming 20 people as an Arbakai force 
is of little use against a 100-fighter Taliban force.  
What happened? Because we could not be in the villages for long periods due to other priorities and missions, 
the Taliban seized the opportunity to coerce the LPBs into joining them. They knew exactly which leaders were most 
susceptible to influence, and thus their coercive power was very effective. In order to survive, the LPBs surrendered to 
the Taliban, allowing them a foothold in their villages. For example, the brother of the provincial governor in Senjetak, 
where I was shot, is now trying to hold on to his reputation and position, and therefore is “playing both sides,” meaning 
that he supports both the government and the Taliban. The same is true in the village of Khwaja Kinti. They have an 
Arbakai force, but it turns with the wind: sometimes it fights against Taliban forces, sometimes it fights against ISAF. 
Their loyalty depends on which side they believe has the best chance of winning the battle. The local powerbroker from 
another village has moved to Meymaneh, where he now sells weapons from his personal arsenal to the Taliban. 
 
Consistency 
“Villages and villagers principally aim to survive and prosper. To do so, they will visibly align or subjugate 
themselves to the dominant, lasting presence,” Petit writes.43 That sentiment means critical importance is placed on 
the consistency of ISAF military forces to maintain the security of a village until it is able to take care of its own security. 
The people must be shown that a more dominant and lasting authority than the Taliban will prevail, Petit says.44 If we 
do not maintain consistency in an area, the Taliban will take it, as was the case in several of the villages in Qaysar and 
Ghormach districts in Farjab and Bagdis Provinces in northwest Afghanistan. My team’s area of responsibility covered 
three districts—Almar, Qaysar, and Ghormach—with a population of approximately 200,000 people. Hundreds of 
villages populate these districts; thus a presence in all of them was impossible. My unit, MOT Navy, had seven soldiers 
and little support from other units; therefore, we could not consistently be present in any single village. 
All in all, as these examples show, the support of local powerbrokers is paramount and should be our first 
priority. Once their support is won, a consistent presence of NATO military forces must be maintained until the villagers 
are strong enough to protect themselves. This can be done by establishing either local security forces or government 
forces strong enough to defeat Taliban attempts to take over. If not, the Taliban will succeed in controlling villages and 
local powerbrokers, and thus, the hearts and minds of the Afghan population. 
 
Navy Lieutenant Ronny Kristoffersen is a Norwegian Coastal Ranger Officer in the Royal Norwegian Navy. He is a degree 
candidate, alongside CTFP Fellows, in the Defense Analysis department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California. 
                                                          
43 Petit, “The Fight for the Village,” 27. 
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Submissions should be in English.  Because we seek  submissions from CTFP’s global community,  and especially look 
forward to work which will stir debate,  WE WILL NOT REJECT submissions outright simply because of poor written 
English.  However, we may ask you to have your submission re-edited before submitting again. 
READY TO SUBMIT?                                                      
By making a submission to CTX you are acknowledging that your submission adheres to all of the "SUBMISSION 
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Al Qaeda’s religiously motivated 
murder of almost 3,000 people…led 
directly to military operations… which … 
mark the longest-ever military 
engagement by America  
since 1776. 
Ten Years Later: Are We Winning the War? 
by Sebastian L. v. Gorka 
The year 2011 marks the 10th anniversary of the horrendous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 45 Al 
Qaeda’ s religiously motivated murder of almost 3,000 people on that sunny Tuesday morning led directly to military 
operations in Afghanistan and then Iraq, which together mark the longest-ever military engagement by America since 
1776. We are still fighting in a war that has already outlasted our combat in Korea, World War II, and even Vietnam. 
Whilst the mastermind behind the September 11th attacks is dead—thanks to the courage and audacity of the U.S. 
military and intelligence community—the war is not over, the enemy not vanquished.  
At the decade-marker for this war, there remain two disturbing truths that the American policy elite has yet to 
recognize or understand: 
• Stunning tactical successes—no matter how 
numerous—do not necessarily lead to strategic 
victory.  
 
• The second related point is that today, a decade 
after September 11, America still does not fully 
understand the nature of the enemy that most 
threatens its citizens; and thus, its strategic 
response is undermined. 
Know the Enemy 
One of the more important reasons for the lack of an effective response to Al Qaeda is the lack of a clear and 
overarching strategy for the post-9/11 era. We have been given first the Global War On Terror (GWOT) and then the 
“Long War,” and now the Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO). But we are still looking for the new George Kennan 
who will write a new version of the “Long Telegram,” which can be used to formulate a doctrine that would be the 
strategic-level equivalent of the Cold War’s containment policy.46 Without a strategic-level doctrine, executing an 
effective response to any significant threat is very difficult. 
                                                          
45 The full testimony can be read at the Council for Emerging National Security Affairs website at 
http://www.censa.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=483:ten-years-on-the-evolution-of-the-terrorist-
threat&Itemid=150, and the video is available on the You Tube website at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gfmN86SlpKY. 
As with all CTX content, the views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or 
any other government agency. 
46 The Council for Emerging National Security Affairs has compiled a survey of national security practitioners and 
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After World War II, it was much easier to effectively communicate the stakes of the confrontation, why 
America had to act, and what we wished to achieve. This was due to several reasons. Communication is best when it 
clearly demonstrates values. After four years of engagement in a global war against a totalitarian enemy, America’s 
values were clear. Likewise, after 30 years, the values of America’s then-enemy, the Soviet Union, were not obtuse or 
difficult to grasp. When we witnessed the Berlin Blockade, the launch of Sputnik, and the first Soviet atomic test, it was 
clear that the game was one of survival—Them or Us. “The Enemy” was clearly an enemy; we knew what they were 
capable of and what they wanted; and most important of all, the previous four years—World War II—had shown us 
who we were. September the 11th was different. 
In the hazy days of post-Cold War peace dividends, because our enemy had been vanquished, or rather, had 
become our “friend,” it was hard to remember what America and the West stood for. The 9/11 attack itself came as a 
huge surprise. Despite the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and 
the 2000 USS Cole attack, we did not appreciate the scale of the threat, the intention of the enemy, or his true 
capabilities. Even after 9/11, we have been obstructed in our understanding of our foe by the fact that his motivation is 
not simply political or rational but is religiously informed and has nothing to do with the logic of nation-state behavior. 
Thanks to this confusion, today, when you ask someone anywhere in the world, with whom they associate the word 
“caliphate,” they will more often than not name Osama bin Laden. If you ask the same person which person or country 
they associate with the words “democracy” or “liberty,” it is unlikely to be the United States. Not so long ago, neither 
statement would have been true. 
To simplify matters—and given the urgency of the task—we can boil down the communications task into three 
fundamental questions the United States and its allies must answer if they are to have any chance of building a 
coherent, strategic approach that can delegitimize Al Qaeda. These questions are: 
1.  Who is the enemy? The answer to this question should be short and simple. 
2.  Who are we? What do we believe in; what do we stand for as a nation? And what do we require of 
other nations that hold themselves to be part of the community of peace-loving and freedom-loving 
countries? 
3.  What are the core values that inform our behavior and our policies and that are not negotiable? 
Given the weakness of communications to date, I would suggest one additional twist. At the moment it would 
be a waste to spend significantly more money trying to make the United States or the  “West” look good in the eyes of 
non-Western audiences. This will most likely come when we are judged by our actions. Instead, we should focus on 
making the enemy look “bad.”  Why is it, for example, that since 9/11 Al Qaeda has been responsible for the death of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      





Vol. 1, No.2      CTX 
 
24 
far more Muslims than Westerners? Publicizing such information is one way we can delegitimize and marginalize 
Al Qaeda.  
There is, however, one last point that has been omitted in all the discussion of strategic communications in the 
past seven years. There is a very important reason that we were much better at strategic communications (or rather 
propaganda and political warfare) during the Cold War. When America established tools such as Voice of America, 
Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe, it was targeting a completely different kind of audience. For the most part, the 
citizens of the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain were not staunch communists who had to be converted through 
these broadcasts. The people of Hungary, Poland, East Germany, the Baltic states, and so on believed in democracy and 
longed to be free. They didn’t tune into our federally funded stations because they wanted to be converted to our 
values system. They were already on our side and simply wanted access to information denied them by their 
illegitimate masters. This is not the situation today. Yesterday’s audience was with us but captive. Today’s audience 
may be suffering under a less-than-democratic regime or an authoritarian government, but that does not mean they 
are necessarily on our side. The Cold War may have been about winning “hearts and minds,” but today we are in the 
era of needing to win “hearts and souls.”  
After Abbottabad—America and the Strategic Principles of Counterterrorism 
The May 2011 special forces raid against Osama bin Laden in Abottabad, Pakistan, will clearly become the 
textbook example of how to perfectly execute high-risk military operations in the post-9/11 world. In locating and 
killing Osama bin Laden on foreign soil, America again demonstrated its peerless capacity at the tactical and operational 
level. Nevertheless, as the supreme military thinker Sun Tzu taught, “tactics without strategy is simply the noise before 
defeat,” and it is my firm conviction that the past 10 years of this conflict have lacked the strategic guidance demanded 
by a threat of the magnitude of transnational terrorism.  
This concept can be illustrated with one simple observation. Since the escalation of the Iraqi insurgency in 
2004, the subsequent rewriting and rapid application of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 on 
Counterinsurgency, and the release of General Stanley McChrystal’s report on operations in Afghanistan, Washington 
has persisted in calling our approach to the threat in theater a “Counterinsurgency Strategy.” (In fact, a basic Internet 
search on the term “Counterinsurgency Strategy” yields more than 300,000 results). This terminology is used despite 
the fact that counterinsurgency always has been, and always will be, a doctrinal approach to irregular warfare, never a 
strategic solution to any kind of threat.  
Strategy explains how one matches resources and methods to ultimate objectives. Strategy explains the “why” 
of war, never the operational “how to” of war. The fact that even official bodies can repeatedly make this mistake so 
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With regard to the requirement to understand the 
enemy, I will share a personal experience. Several years after 
9/11, I was invited to address a senior group of special 
operations officers on the last day of a three-day event 
analyzing progress in the conflict. As I rose to speak on the 
final day, I told the assembled officers—all of whom had just 
returned from the theater of operations or who were about 
to deploy there—that I would have to discard my prepared 
comments. The reason was that for 2½ days I had witnessed 
brave men who were risking their lives debate with each 
other and us, the invited guests, over who was the enemy 
they were fighting. Debates focused on whether Al Qaeda is 
an organization, a movement, a network, or an ideology. This, I said, would be akin to U.S. officers debating each other 
in 1944 over the question of what was the Third Reich or what did Nazism actually represent. The plain fact of the 
matter is that we have institutionally failed to meet our duty to become well informed on the threat doctrine of our 
enemy. And without a clear understanding of the enemy threat doctrine, victory is likely impossible.  
The reasons for our paucity in this area are many. In the preceding section, we discussed the functional 
problems, most of which stem from two serious and connected obstacles of strategic magnitude. The first is a 
misguided belief that the religious character of the enemy’s ideology should not be discussed and that we need not 
address it, but should instead use the phrase “violent extremism” to describe our foe and thus avoid any unnecessary 
unpleasantness. The second is that even if we could demonstrate clear-headedness on the issue and recognize the 
religious ideology of Al Qaeda and its associate movements for what it is—a form of hybrid totalitarianism—we still 
drastically lack the institutional ability to analyze and comprehend the worldview of the enemy and therefore its 
strategic mindset and ultimate objectives. 
Here it is enlightening to look to the past to understand just how great a challenge is posed by the need for our 
national security establishment to understand its new enemy. It is now well recognized that it was only in 1946, with 
the authoring of George Kennan’s classified “Long Telegram” (later republished pseudonymously as The Sources of 
Soviet Conduct) that America began to understand the nature of the Soviet Union, why it acted the way it did, how the 
Kremlin thought, and why the U.S.S.R. was an existential threat to America.47 Consider now the fact that this document 
was written three decades after the Russian Revolution, and that despite all the scholarship and analysis available in 
the United States, it took more than a generation to penetrate the mind of the enemy and come to a point where a 
                                                          
47 The declassified text of Kennan’s original cable can be found on the Nevada Technical Associates website at 
http://www.ntanet.net/KENNAN.html. The pseudonymous article he later wrote for a broader audience in Foreign Affairs 
is on the History Guide website at http://www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html (both accessed June 15, 2011). 
 
Debates focused on whether  
Al Qaeda is an organization, a 
movement, a network, or an ideology. 
This, I said, would be akin to  
U.S. officers debating each other in 1944 
over the question of what was the Third 
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counterstrategy could be formulated. Now add to this the fact that today our enemy is not a European, secular, nation-
state—as was the U.S.S.R.—but a non-European, religiously informed, non-state, terrorist group, and we see the 
magnitude of the challenge. Whilst initiatives such as Fort Leavenworth’s Human Terrain System (HTS) and the teams 
they provide to theater commanders are well-meaning efforts in the right direction—trying to understand the context 
of the enemy—they still miss the mark on more than one level.  
To begin with, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to provide the contextual knowledge we need to understand 
and defeat our enemy if we rely solely upon anthropologists and social scientists, as the HTS does. Today, our 
multidisciplinary analysis of the enemy and his doctrine requires just as much—if not more—expertise from the 
regional historian and the theologian, the specialist who knows when and how Sunni Islam split from Shia Islam and 
who understands the difference between the Meccan and Medinan verses of the Quran. We should ask ourselves 
honestly how many national security practitioners know the answers to these questions, or at least have somewhere to 
turn within government to provide them such essential expertise. 
Secondly, we must—after seven years—take the counsel of the 9/11 Congressional Commission seriously in 
recognizing that the threat environment itself has radically changed beyond the capacity of our legacy national security 
structures to deal with it.  
In the case of how two of the 9/11 hijackers (Nawaf al-Hamzi and Khalid al-Midhar) were flagged as threats but 
still permitted to enter the United States legally, we see proof of how our national security structures do not match up 
well to the threat our new enemies represent. This problem is not unique to the United States, but is a product of what 
the academic world calls the Westphalian system of nation-states and how we are structured to protect ourselves.  
In the 350 years since the Treaty of Westphalia marked the end of the religious wars of Europe, Western 
nations developed and perfected national security architectures that were predicated on an institutional division of 
labor and discrete categorization of threats. Internally, we had to maintain constitutionality and law and order. 
Externally, we had to deal with the threat of aggression from another state. As a result, all our countries divided 
national security tasks into separate conceptual and functional baskets: internal versus external; military versus 
nonmilitary. And this system worked very well for 3½ centuries during which time states fought other nation-states—
the age of so-called “conventional warfare.” However, as Philip Bobbitt has so masterfully described in his book, The 
Shield of Achilles, that age is behind us. Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, or even the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be forced into 
Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, or even the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be forced into analytic 
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Congress itself will have to remove 
outdated limitations on our national 
ability to fight the war of ideas—such 
as the Smith-Mundt Act—which were 
born of a bygone age before modern 
communications technologies… 
analytic boxes which are military or nonmilitary, or into internal or external threat categories.48 We must recognize the 
hard truth that the threat environment is no longer primarily defined by the state-actor. 
Take, for example, the case of the most successful Al Qaeda attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, the Fort Hood 
massacre. A major serving in the U.S. Army decided that his loyalty lay with his Muslim coreligionists and not his 
nation or his branch of service. He was recruited, encouraged, and finally blessed in his actions by Anwar al-
Awlaki, a U.S. citizen and Muslim cleric who was hiding out in Yemen. When Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan was about 
to be deployed in the service of our country, he instead chose the path of holy war against the infidel and slew 
13 and wounded 31 of his fellow servicemen and their family members and colleagues on the largest U.S. Army 
base in the United States.  
How Westphalian was this deadly attack by Al Qaeda? What does it have to do with conventional warfare? Was 
this threat external or internal in nature? Was it a military attack or a nonmilitary one? As you see, the conceptual 
frameworks and capabilities that served us so well through the last century fail us today in the 21st century. As a result, 
we must develop new methodologies to analyze the threats to our nation and new ways to bridge the 
conventional gaps between government and agency departments and their respective mindsets—gaps which 
are so deftly exploited by groups such as Al Qaeda.49 We must recognize that the master of military strategy, 
Carl von Clausewitz, wrote his meisterwerk in the context 
of station state war. His trinity of government, people, and 
military and the related characteristics of reason, passion, 
and skill do not pertain in the realm of irregular warfare as 
they do in conventional war (see Figure 1). Today the 
enemy is more flexible and not driven by rational 
conceptualizations of raison d’etat. 
 
                                                          
48 Philip Bobbitt: The Shield of Achilles—War, Peace and the Course of History, (New York: Random House, 2002). I take 
the discussion further and discuss just how different this post-Westphalian threat environment is and how we need to 
reappraise key Clausewitzian aspects of the analysis of war in “The Age of Irregular Warfare—So What?,” Joint Forces 
Quarterly, 58 no. 3 (2010): 32–38.  
49 For a di scussion of how to institutionally and conceptually bridge these gaps and so be able to defeat the new types 
of threat we face, see the concept “Super-Purple” described in my chapter, “International Cooperation as a Tool in 
Counterterrorism: Super-Purple as a Weapon to Defeat the Nonrational Terrorist,” in Toward a Grand Strategy Against 
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Whilst bin Laden may be dead, 
the narrative of religiously motivated 
global revolution that he embodied 
is very much alive and growing 
 in popularity. 
 
The paradox of Al Qaeda is that whilst we have in the past 10 years been incredibly successful in militarily 
degrading its operational capacity to directly do us harm, it has become even more powerful in the domain of 
ideological warfare and other indirect forms of attack. Whilst bin Laden may be dead, the narrative of religiously 
motivated global revolution that he embodied is very much alive and growing in popularity.50 Whilst we have crippled Al 
Qaeda’s capacity to execute mass casualty attacks with its own assets on the mainland of the United States, we see that 
its message continues to hold traction with individuals prepared to bring the fight to us individually, be it Major Hasan, 
would-be Times Square attacker Faisal Shahzad, or Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day or “underwear bomber.” 
 
Counterterrorism: Beyond the Kinetic 
Although we have proven our capacity in the past 10 years 
to kinetically engage our enemy at the operational and tactical level 
with unsurpassed effectiveness, we have not even begun to take the 
war to Al Qaeda at the strategic level of counterideology. To 
paraphrase Dr. James Kiras of the Air University, whose views I 
                                                          
50 For the rise of jihadi ideology and what should be done in response, see Sebastian L. v. Gorka: “The Surge that Could 
Defeat Al Qaeda,” (August 10, 2009), retrieved from the Foreign Policy website: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/10/the_one_surge_that_could_defeat_al_qaeda; (accessed June 15, 2011). 
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…imagine if in the fight against the Ku Klux Klan federal law 
enforcement had been forbidden from describing that group 
as white supremacists or racists…  
We did not do it then, and we must not do it now. 
highly respect, we have denied Al Qaeda the capability to conduct complex, devastating attacks on the scale of 9/11, 
but we now need to transition from concentrating on dismantling and disrupting Al Qaeda’s network to undermining its 
core strategy of ideological attack. We need to employ much more the indirect approach made famous by our 
community of Special Forces operators of working “by, with, and through” local allies—moving beyond direct attacks 
on the enemy at the operational and tactical levels to attacking it indirectly at the strategic level.  
We need to bankrupt transnational jihadist terrorism at it most powerful point: its narrative of global, religious 
war. For the majority of the past 10 years, the narrative of the conflict has been controlled by our enemy. Just as we did 
in the Cold War, the United States must take active measures to arrive at a position where it shapes the agenda and the 
story of the conflict, where we force our enemy onto his back foot to such an extent that jihadism eventually loses all 
credibility and implodes as an ideology. For this to happen, we must rethink from the ground up the way in which 
strategic communications and information operations are run across the U.S. government. Additionally,  
Our ability to fight Al Qaeda and similar transnational terrorist actors will depend upon our capacity to 
communicate to our own citizens and to the world what we are fighting for and how the ideology of jihad threatens the 
universal values we hold so 
dear. To quote Sun Tzu again, in 
war it is not enough to know the 
enemy in order to win; one 
must first know oneself. During 
the Cold War, this self-knowledge happened naturally. Given the nature of the Soviet Union and the nuclear threat it 
clearly posed to the West, from the first successful Soviet atom-bomb test to the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, every 
day for four decades Americans knew what was at stake and why communism could not be allowed to spread its 
totalitarian grip beyond the Iron Curtain.  
However, with the end of the Cold War and the decade of peace dividends that defined the 1990s, America and the 
West understandably lost clarity with regard to what about its way of life was precious and worth fighting for after the 
specter of World War III had been vanquished and the (Cold) War had been won. 
The shock of the September 11th attacks did not, however, automatically return us to a point of clarity. The 
reasons for this flow from several of the observations I have already made, and also from the fact that our current 
enemy is a religiously colored one unlike the secular foe we faced during the Cold War.  
Due in part to a misinterpretation of what the Founding Fathers actually meant by “separation of church and 
state,” today we have hobbled our capacity to understand and counter this enemy at the strategic level. Based upon 
my experience with military operators and also U.S. law enforcement officers fighting terrorism at home, many in 
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… his ideology of global supremacy 
through religious war is far more 
vibrant and sympathetic to 
audiences around the world than it 
was on the day before the attacks 
10 years ago 
become a taboo issue within national threat analysis. This has been done despite that fact that all those who 
have brought death to our shores as Al Qaeda operatives have done so not out of purely political conviction but 
clearly as a result of the fact that they feel transcendentally justified, that they see their violent deeds as 
sanctioned by God. If we wish to 
combat the ideology that drives 
these murderers, we ignore the 
role of religion at our own peril. 
The official decision in recent years to use the misleading term “violent extremism” to describe the 
threat is deleterious to our ability to understand the enemy and defeat it. America is not at war with all forms 
of violent extremism. The attacks of September 11 were not the work of a group of terrorists motivated by a 
generic form of extremism. We are not at war with communists, fascists, or nationalists, but religiously inspired 
mass murderers who consistently cite the Quran to justify their actions. Denying this fact simply out of a 
misguided sensitivity will delay our ability to understand the nature of this conflict and to delegitimize our foe. 
By analogy, imagine if in the fight against the Ku Klux Klan federal law enforcement had been forbidden from 
describing that group as white supremacists or racists, or if during WWII, for political reasons, we forbade our 
forces from understanding the enemy as a Nazi regime fueled and guided by a fascist ideology of racial hatred, 
but demanded they be called “violent extremists” instead. We did not do it then, and we must not do it now. 
The safety of America’s citizens and our chances of eventual victory depend upon our being able to call the 
enemy by its proper name: Global Jihadism.51 
To conclude, the past 10 years since September 11, 
2001, can be summarized as a vast collection of tactical and 
operational successes but a vacuum in terms of strategic 
understanding and strategic response. To paraphrase a 
former U.S. Marine who knows the enemy very well and 
whom I greatly respect, we have failed to understand the 
enemy at any more than an operational level and have 
instead, by default, addressed the enemy solely on the 
operational plane of engagement. Operationally we have 
                                                          
51 For the best work on understanding the enemy we now face, see Patrick Sookhdeo’s Global Jihad: The Future in the 
Face of Militant Islam (McLean, VA: Isaac Publishing, 2007); and the analytic works of Stephen Ulph, including: Towards 
a Curriculum for Teaching Jihadist Ideology, The Jamestown Foundation, available at the Jamestown Foundation 
website: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36999. For an overview of the key 
thinkers and strategists of global jihadi ideology, see Sebastian L. v. Gorka: Jihadist Ideology: The Core Texts, lecture to 
the Westminster Institute. Audio and transcript available at the Westminster Institute website: http://www.westminster-
institute.org/articles/jihadist-ideology-the-core-texts-3/#more-385. (Both were accessed June 15, 2011). 
 We are not at war with communists, fascists, or 
nationalists, but religiously inspired mass murderers 
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become most proficient at responding to the localized threats caused by Al Qaeda, but those localized threats 
are simply tactical manifestations of what is happening at the strategic level and driven by the ideology of Global 
Jihad. As a result, by not responding to what Al Qaeda has become at the strategic level, we continue to attempt to 
engage it on the wrong battlefield.  
The 10th anniversary of the attacks in Washington, DC, in New York, and in Pennsylvania afford those in 
the U.S. government who have sworn to uphold and defend the national interests of this greatest of nations a 
clear opportunity to recognize what we have accomplished and what needs to be reassessed. All involved must 
begin anew to recommit themselves to attacking this deadliest of enemies at the level which it deserves to be—
and must be—which is, of course, the strategic level.  
Osama bin Laden may be dead, but his ideology of global supremacy through religious war is far more 
vibrant and sympathetic to audiences around the world than it was on the day before the attacks 10 years ago. 
We need to guarantee the conditions by which the executive branch is able finally to produce a comprehensive 
understanding of the enemy threat doctrine that is Global Jihadism, a feat akin to Kennan’s foundational 
analysis that eventually led to the Truman Doctrine and its exquisite operationalization in Paul Nitze’s plan for 
containment, NSC-68.52  
Ten years into this war, a strategic re-evaluation is justified. I suggest four successful principles that can 
guide such a re-evaluation:53 
1. The United States must suppress the sphere of mobility of Al Qaeda and its Associated Movements 
(AQAM). This war will not end in a neat ceasefire and peace treaty. It must consist of a constant pressure 
against both the will and the capability of global jihadists to do us harm.  
 
2. The American intelligence and national security communities must invest far greater effort into 
understanding the historic, economic, social and political factors that AQAM uses to mobilize its followers 
and operators. This is NOT a cause-and-effect relationship, but a dynamic whereby elite ideologies exploit 
objective conditions through a subject mobilizing religious ideology. 
 
 
                                                          
52 The declassified NSC-68 which operationalized George Kennan’s enemy threat doctrine analysis of the USSR can be 
retrieved from the Air Force Magazine website: http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2004/December%202004/1204keeperfull.pdf (accessed June 15, 2011). 
53 For a lengthier discussion of these principles, see the forthcoming monograph “Developing an Integrated Approach to 
Counterterrorism: Connecting the Academic, Operational and Policy Arenas” (working title) by Gorka, Sloan, and 
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3. This war is no longer simply about hijacked planes, IEDs or gunmen. Ten years after 9/11, it is perhaps more 
nonkinetic than it is physical. America must rediscover and deploy the tools it used so effectively in past 
ideological wars to build a powerful and globally applicable counter-narrative. This narrative must 
undermine the legitimacy and attractiveness of the enemy, as well as deter potential allies and recruits. 
America must drive the global agenda of justice and liberty, as it did during WWII and the Cold War. 
 
4. The American national security establishment must purge itself of well-intentioned but neutering concepts 
of political correctness and cultural sensitivity concerning the identity of the enemy and what the enemy 
intends. AQAM uses religion not only to win adherents, but also to justify mass murder. We must tackle 
this reality head-on. The religious nature of our enemy’s ideology cannot obstruct us from defining and 
realizing our national interests. 
Only if we have an overarching strategic response will America be able to defeat Al Qaeda and its associates 
before the next significant anniversary of 9/11. 
 
 
Sebastian L. v. Gorka, Ph.D., is director of the Homeland Defense Fellowship Program, College of International 
Security Affairs, National Defense University; and Military Affairs Fellow with the Foundation for Defense of 
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Focus on Algeria 
Not only has Algeria earned a distinct place in the annals of international terrorism, but terrorism 
is hardly only a matter of historic interest in the Maghreb.  It is an ongoing concern.  Movies, books, and 
articles offer numerous interpretations of how Algerians have responded to their country’s waves of 
violence.  One can hardly contemplate the use of torture, for instance, without recalling the movie, The 
Battle of Algiers.  Liberation struggles the world over have looked to the Algerian example for inspiration.  
And Western counterterrorism and counterinsurgency thinking have been indisputably shaped by French 
and Algerian lessons learned. 
Given its pivotal geographic position, both in the Maghreb and along the Mediterranean, this 
2.4 million square-kilometer country continues to capture global headlines – not in the least because Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to try to shred regional ties and stability through 
ongoing attacks and kidnappings. 
This section provides CTFP and other CT readers with a fresh look at a most important country, 
focusing on evolving strains of dangerous ideologies, and the use of torture in countering terrorism.  At 
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Islamism in Algeria and the Evolution to AQIM: Transformations of Significance and Insignificance 
by Rich Nessel 
Islamism54 has a long history in Algeria, but it has been marred in the 
past 20 years by the deaths of 100,000 to 200,000 citizens killed in conflicts 
with religious roots.55  The notions of Islamism, Islamic fundamentalists, 
radical Islamists, and Muslim extremists within Algeria—and the world—
lamentably have been lumped into one category, which oversimplifies the 
complex ideologies involved.  The purpose of this article is twofold: to define 
the forms of Algerian Islamism, which will expose the complexities and varying 
approaches to Islamism under a secular regime, and to highlight a particularly 
sinister brand of Islamism, which will demonstrate why the specific strain of revolutionary Islamism brought by the 
Armed Islamic Groups (GIA) is so radically unique.56  This framework will allow for a better understanding of the current 
form of violent Islamism within Algeria as practiced by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  Within this historical 
view, the recent rise of AQIM seems far less ominous as it appears to be little more than the GIA with a new name. 
Three Categories of Islamists 
 Algerian Islamist organizations are heterogeneous, with different philosophies that do not fit comfortably into 
one order, and they represent the full spectrum of views regarding how Islam relates to personal life and the 
government. Islamist groups fall into three broad categories, which are listed below.57 
                                                          
54 The terms Islamism and Islamist have different connotations depending on the way it is used.  Here, Islamism means the Muslim 
pursuit of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law.  As demonstrated in this article, there are varying degrees through 
which Islamists pursue this goal, be they fundamentalist or moderate.  The way this term is used is meant to encapsulate the full 
breadth of those with Islamist pursuits.   
55 Salima Mellah, “Justice Commission for Algeria: The Massacres in Algeria, 1992-2004,” retrieved from Justice Commission for 
Algeria website, (May 2004), http://www.algerie-tpp.org/tpp/pdf/dossier_2_massacres.pdf (accessed August 6, 2011), 7. 
56 The GIA would later fracture into the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which eventually would change its name to 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Camille Tawil, Brothers in Arms: The Story of Al-Qa'ida and the Arab Jihadists (London: Saqi, 
2010), 127, 195. 
57 This is roughly analogous to Quintan Wiktorowicz’s purists, politicos and jihadi categories of Salafism in his work, “Anatonomy of 
the Salafi Movement,” (2006), retrieved from CÉRIUM website, 
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These are religious people who proselytize to individuals or communities in an attempt 
to persuade people to lead morally correct lifestyles through the tenets of Islam. 
1. Apolitical Islamists believe adherence to the fundamentals of Islam is a community or individual responsibility, 
and that government or political reform is not necessary.58   
2. Political Islamists believe an Islamic state is the best form of government, but think satisfactory Islamic 
governance can be achieved through political participation in a secular system.59  
3. Revolutionary Islamists believe an Islamic state must be established immediately and think the only way to 
achieve this state is through violent jihad.  Their goal is to overthrow the government and impose their version 
of God’s will upon the people.60 
  
Apolitical Islamists 
 The first group of individuals, the apolitical Islamists, is the most benign, even if they are not completely 
benevolent  These groups can be compared to many Western Christian community and church organizations such as the 
Salvation Army61 and the Knights of Columbus;62 such groups actively seek social change within their communities but 
do not advocate for fundamental political change or a theocratic solution.  Algeria has a long history of organizations 
dedicated to spiritual enlightenment and reform that are comparable to these Western groups.63 
The indigenous Berber population of Algeria makes up one such enlightenment group.  The Berbers have always 
maintained close ties to their long-standing Sufi traditions, without advocating for government intervention to enforce 
those traditions.64  Abdelhamid Ben Badis is an example of an apolitical reformer.  He brought about a more Salafist 
point of view and is probably the most notable leader of social reform within Algeria.65  Ben Badis was responsible for 
the formation of the Association of Algerian Ulama (AUMA) in May 1931.66  The AUMA specifically stated within its 
                                                          
58 Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria (Lebanon, NY: Ithaca, 1996), 86. 
59 Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria 1988–2002 (London: Verso, 2003), 100. 
60 Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War 1990–1998. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 60–62. 
61 The Salvation Army website, http://www.salvationarmyusa.org/usn/www_usn_2.nsf/vw-local/About-us. 
62 The Knights of Columbus website, http://www.kofc.org/un/en/about/index.html. 
63 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 9–18. 
64 Berbers are the native inhabitants of North Africa and Algeria.  They are often called “Berber Arabs,” as they are nomadic people 
like the Arabs of the Middle East.  The Berbers were conquered by Arab Muslims in the 700s, and subsequently converted to their 
own form of Islam.  Sufism is a form of mystical Islam, and Berber Sufism incorporates traditions the Berbers practiced prior to being 
conquered by the Arabs.  Before the fall of the Ottoman Empire, most of Algeria practiced Sufism. Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 1–8. 
65 Salafism is a philosophy that seeks to return to the original form of Islam, based on scripture.  Salafism is most similar to 
Wahhabism and Arab fundamentalism.  Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 8–12. 
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 The promotion of religious 
education is not at all foreign to 
efforts seen throughout Western 
nations, such as ideas promoted by 
the Christian Educators Association 
International (CEAI). 
bylaws that participation in the Algerian political system was “rigorously forbidden.”67  Instead, AUMA advocated for 
reform at the community and individual level, which was similar to the position of a 1960s Islamist group, al-Qiyam.  
Unfortunately, al-Qiyam was outlawed by the Algerian government in 1970 as it edged closer to political Islamism.68  In 
recent years, organizations preaching Da’wa Salafism (an apolitical form of Salafism) have grown in popularity, primarily 
because it does not represent a notable threat to the Algerian 
government.69  
 Apolitical Islamist groups, like the Da’wa Salafists, have 
traditionally sought educational reforms in an attempt to incorporate 
Islamic education into the lives of the population.70 Some reforms 
have been accomplished at various times in Algeria through the 
efforts of AUMA, and in the mid-1960s by Malek Bennabi.71  The 
promotion of religious education is not at all foreign to efforts seen 
throughout Western nations, such as ideas promoted by the 
Christian Educators Association International (CEAI).72  Apolitical 
Islamists advocate for private religious education similar to the programs promoted by CEAI.  Their efforts contrast with 
those of the political Islamists who advocate for government-controlled, public, religious education. 
Political Islamists 
 This second group of Islamists participates and campaigns within the political system of the state to enact 
changes.  This group believes an Islamic nation as dictated by the Quran prophetic model would be a better solution 
than the current secular government.73 Political Islamists believe incremental political change should be the primary 
method to achieve this new government, which is an important distinction between them and revolutionary Islamists.  
 The pursuit of incremental Islamist changes has played out many times within Algeria.  During the war of 
independence from France (1954–1962), Islamists were in the ranks of those attempting to form a new government.74  
Although other parties shut out the Islamists following independence in 1962, the political Islamists’ ideals never 
                                                          
67 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 13. 
68 Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 166–77. 
69 Amel Boubekeur, “Salafism and Radical Politics in Postconflict Algeria,” (September 2008), retrieved from the Carnegie Middle 
East Center website, http://www.carnegie–mec.org, 13–17. 
70 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 11. 
71 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 11–13, 57–60. 
72 Christian Educators Association International website, http://www.ceai.org/. 
73 Tawil, Brothers in Arms, 45. 
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faded.75  When a more democratic government emerged within Algeria in 1988, the Islamists achieved widespread 
public popularity.76 A 1991 Islamist political victory was thwarted by a military coup d’état that unleashed a violent civil 
war, but even after that, political Islamists still advocated for negotiation and political solutions.77 
 Early forms of political Islamist groups were characterized by the Jazira trend, which represented the more 
peaceful-minded groups who advocated social and political movements to effect governmental change.78  The leaders 
who formed this group were some of the politically involved AUMA members who had been crowded out of the political 
process by secular groups after Algeria won independence from France.79  This power arrangement remained in effect 
until the death of President Houari Boumedienne in 1978, which created a power vacuum.80  His death coincided with 
economic woes and widespread desire for change within the government.81  Attempting to avert public unrest, the 
regime under President Chadli Bendjedid attempted to avert public unrest by making the government more transparent 
and allowing the participation of 
multiple political parties.82  This was a 
significant change for Algeria, as Algeria 
had basically been a one-party system 
after it had achieved independence, 
and the shift to a plural democracy 
allowed the previously muted Islamist 
voice to rise to the top.83 
 The political Islamist groups during the pro-democracy period (1988–1992) were characterized by the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS), al-Harakat li-Mujtama’ Islami (HAMAS) and the Harakat al-Nahda al-Islamiyya (MNI).84  The political 
Islamists formed political parties and campaigned for office in local and national elections, and within a short time, they 
had won many seats within the local and national legislatures.85  The next bout of elections in 1991 brought an even 
greater victory for the Islamists, in particular the FIS.  With the political Islamists on the verge of taking a clear 
                                                          
75 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 390. 
76 Democracy began to emerge in Algeria as the regime sought to maintain control during a period of poor economic times and high 
public unemployment.  To solve the unrest, President Chadli Bendjedid proposed a series of measures to improve transparency and 
plurality in the government.  Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 394. 
77 Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria, 371–72. 
78 Shahin, Political Ascent, 120-21. 
79 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 35-37. 
80 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 61, 69–70. 
81 William Quandt, Between Ballots & Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
1998), 159; Shahin, Political Ascent. 
82 Shahin, Political Ascent, 127–29. 
83 Willis, The Islamist Challenge, 112–13. 
84 Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria, 65. 
85 Martinez, Algerian Civil War, 20–22. 
…the coup essentially nullified the electoral victory by the 
Islamists.  The political Islamist groups responded with 
demands to restore the constitution and the National 
Assembly, which evolved into open demonstrations and 
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democratic majority (winning 188 of 232 seats in the first round of voting), events took a sudden turn away from 
democracy.86 
 In 1992, the Algerian military orchestrated a coup by claiming the regime was collapsing.87  President Bendjedid 
was forced by the military to dissolve the National Assembly and resign from office.88  The military feared that the 
election results would mean “one man, one vote, but only once.”89  This prevailing anti-Islamist view feared that after 
the Islamists had won a political majority they would disassemble the democratic establishment to construct an Algerian 
theocratic system under Shariah law. Therefore90  The military, responding to demonstrations and actions by some 
revolutionary Islamists, outlawed the Islamist political parties and jailed some of their leaders and followers.91 
Nonetheless, even this severe repression did not stop the political Islamists from continuing to advocate for political 
solutions to the increasing violent struggle. 
 Since 1992, organizations like the Wafa party have continued to fight through peaceful demonstrations and 
political maneuvering to re-establish an outlet for their Islamist views.92  The use of peaceful tactics by these groups 
does not mean these organizations never employed violence as a mechanism for change.  On the contrary, violence was 
utilized by many organizations within this rubric—such as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the armed wing of the FIS.93  
However, such groups did not use violence as their primary tool to force change but as one to achieve influence in 
politics.94 
 The political Islamist philosophy continues to exist in Algeria, and as late as 2002 a resurgence of political 
Islamism crept back into the Algerian political arena.  The Movement for National Reform, a moderate Islamic party, has 
seen mild success, winning about 11% of the seats in the National Assembly.95  Political Islamists continue to hope for 
reconciliation that will resolve the long-standing conflict and allow them to fully participate in the Algerian government.  
In sharp contrast, revolutionary Islamists are wholly against any reconciliation or notion of working within the bounds of 
secular government.96   
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…revolutionary Islamists…believe that any government not 
founded completely on Islamic tradition is tantamount to 
heresy and that the “heretics” of secular governments will 
not give up their power unless they are removed by force. 
Revolutionary Islamists 
 The third form of Islamism promotes a view that Islam has an absolute interpretation and that the only way to 
achieve a nation under Islam is by violent jihad.  Fundamentally, revolutionary Islamists believe the only solution to 
governance is an Islamic nation under Shariah law.  Further, they believe that any government not founded completely 
on Islamic tradition is tantamount to heresy and that the “heretics” of secular governments will not give up their power 
unless they are removed by force.97  Thus, revolutionary Islamists justify uncompromising actions of violent jihad to 
achieve their goal of a nation governed by Shariah. 
 Such Islamist groups were initially characterized by the Algerian Islamic Movement (MIA), formed by Mustapha 
Bouyali, and later by the al-Takfir wa’Hirja.98  After Algeria gained independence from France, these groups stockpiled 
weapons and conducted covert warfare against the state.99  Although these Islamists groups were ever-present, they 
were often termed as bandits or criminals and not seen as a substantial threat to the state.  However, as the political 
situation within Algeria deteriorated, local support grew for revolutionary Islamists.100  This newfound popularity 
allowed for the birth of militant Islamist organizations such as the GIA and the Movement for an Islamic State (MEI).101 
 Revolutionary Islamist 
organizations within Algeria took to 
the offensive after the 1992 coup, 
striking out against the government 
in a series of attacks and 
assassinations.  The first attack was against an army barracks on January 22, 1992, which unleashed a series of 
government reprisals, effectively intensifying the violence on both sides.102  A spiral of violent rebellion and repression 
ensued for the next five years.103  During this period, a competition of ideologies began within the Islamists as well.   
 The political Islamists were competing with the revolutionary Islamists for legitimacy and public support.  
Groups like the FIS attempted to sue for peace and a return to politics, while organizations like the GIA and MNI104 saw 
no place for compromise and purposely sabotaged ceasefire agreements.105 The convictions of the GIA were so strong 
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that its agents assassinated fellow Islamists simply for attempting to negotiate with the secular government.106  
Additionally, the GIA assassinated fighters of a neighboring jihad organization, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Groups 
(LIFG).107  In effect, organizations like the GIA were not only disinterested in peace, they were actively preventing it from 
occurring. 
 However, the public finally lost tolerance for the indiscriminate killing and withdrew support for the GIA.  About 
the same time, the government began reconciliation programs to reintegrate the Islamist fighters.  These two factors 
brought the decline of the GIA in the late 1990s.108  Additionally, one GIA commander who was disgusted by some of 
the group’s actions separated and formed his own organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in 
1998.109  Consequently, the GIA withered on the vine and, by the mid-2000s, was no longer a major threat.110  The GSPC 
fought on against the Algerian regime but no longer waged an open war against the population and foreign interests.111  
Though this approach was more tolerable, the general public was by and large done with war after witnessing the death 
of between 100,000 and 200,000 citizens during the civil war.112 This public sentiment, along with effective government 
reconciliation programs and the loss of religious support for the jihad, led to the steady decline in the GSPC as an 
effective insurgent organization.113  The GSPC was on the path to failure. 
The Roots of AQIM 
 Sensing a need for significant change, the leadership of the GSPC declared itself subservient to Al Qaeda (AQ), 
114  and in 2007, the GSPC formally became Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).115  More than a name change, the 
transformation was meant to project an image of an entirely new group, and along with a new propaganda campaign 
came a return to attacks on Western targets and a rise in suicide bomb attacks.116  Additionally, AQIM attempted to 
broaden its reach as a regional threat by increasing fundraising, trafficking, training, and recruiting in areas of the Sahel, 
such as Mali and Niger. 
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 Though publicized as a regional 
terrorist organization, AQIM showed 
“no real threat” to any regime 
within North Africa,1   and the 
fundamental goal of establishing an 
Islamic state in Algeria remained its  
top objective. 
 However, AQIM did not fundamentally change its strategic goals from those of the GSPC or GIA. Though 
publicized as a regional terrorist organization, AQIM showed “no real threat” to any regime within North Africa,117   and 
the fundamental goal of establishing an Islamic state in Algeria remained its top objective.  This focus is evidenced within 
the 2010 U.S. Bureau of Diplomatic Security report, which notes that AQIM has continued its focus on Algeria.  The 
report summarizes 196 bombings and 170 other terrorist acts inside Algeria in 2010.118   In comparison, AQIM 
conducted a total of six attacks in 2010 through the beginning of 2011 across the Sahel (Mauritania, Mali and Niger).119  
  AQIM and its predecessor, the GIA, have yet to meet their objectives of establishing an Islamic state in Algeria 
through jihad, and in fact appear further from success since 1992.   Although the public appears to desire reconciliation, 
AQIM has continued to fight.  The reason that Algerian revolutionary Islamism, in its latest form of AQIM, has persisted 
is predicated on the rise of the GIA, which is unique within the three forms of Algerian Islamism discussed thus far. 
Birth of the GIA 
 Revolutionary Islamist groups, including the MIA and al-Takfir wa’Hirja, existed within Algeria well before the 
1992 founding of the GIA.120  However, the GIA had a wholly different origin and, therefore, a different strategy to jihad.  
The MIA and MEI, which relied on attacks against the government and its institutions, predominantly viewed the public, 
foreigners, and competing Islamists as neutral parties.121  The GIA 
did not, instead viewing all who failed to actively support its jihad 
as collaborators with the government, hence making them eligible 
military targets based on takfir beliefs.  Under the takfiri policy, the 
GIA slaughtered entire villages, murdered foreigners, and killed 
citizens for “violating Islamic law,” with executions carried out for 
infractions ranging from infidelity to wearing Western clothing.122  
In this way, the ideas of the GIA essentially differed from those of 
other Algerian, revolutionary Islamist organizations. 
 The major difference in ideology was born in the Soviet-Afghan War, which exposed between 1,200 to 2,000 
Algerian fighters who served in the conflict to the hard-line precepts of Arab Islamism.123  The Algerian-Afghans (as they 
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AQ was instrumental to the formation of the GIA; however, responsibility for the 
carnage of the Algerian Civil War does not rest solely on Al Qaeda. 
became known) were particularly exposed to the teachings of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden.124  These 
Algerian fighters trained in the Pakistani camps set up by the Arab and Egyptian mujahadeen, and there, some members 
were indoctrinated while others were simply exposed to the more revolutionary ideas of the mujahadeen.125  One 
Afghan-Algerian mujahad, Qari Said al-Jazairi, served as an AQ facilitator and messenger and would later be influential in 
establishing the GIA with AQ startup money and recruiting.126  Thus, Algerian-Afghan veterans like Qari Said imported 
their ideas from the future leadership of AQ. 
 AQ was instrumental to the formation of the GIA; however, responsibility for the carnage of the Algerian Civil 
War does not rest solely on Al Qaeda.  AQ leaders certainly had a hand in the war, but it was not all their doing.  In the 
beginning, the few Algerian-Afghan veterans brought inspiration, leadership, professional fighting skills, organization, 
and determination with them to Algeria.  But as the GIA evolved, Algerians who had not served in Afghanistan became 
its primary constituents.  These GIA members more than likely were former members of the FIS, MIA, or other Algerian 
Islamist organizations.  As AQ formed in Sudan, it played a role as a GIA sponsor, providing funding, training, and 
support; and reports from before 2001 that highlight the open support coming from Sudan to the GIA may allude to the 
genesis of AQ in Sudan.127  Ultimately, however, as referenced by Wright in The Looming Tower, the GIA acted on its 
own to reach levels of violence well beyond the scope of what AQ had intended, which eventually caused a cooling of 
relations between the two groups.128 
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… an attempt to restart the engine 
of takfiri had begun by Afghan 
veterans like Qari Said. 
Evolution of the GIA  
 By the time Djamel Zitouni took over the GIA in 1995, he had completely incorporated the principles of takfiri 
violence.129  Zitouni had condemned the entire society of Algeria and any foreign influence.  “The Butcher,” as he 
became known, lashed out at all outside his organization.  His successor, Antar Zwabri, went even further and was 
responsible for the worst massacres of the entire conflict.130  In retrospect, the GIA was a spawn of AQ ideology that 
received its baptism under fire in Algeria as Algerians in the GIA simply ran with the ideological beliefs, taking them to an 
extreme end.  The GIA village massacres of 1997 and 1998 precipitated the eventual split to the GSPC.131    
 In 2001, AQ sent an emissary to meet with Hattab, the leader of the GSPC, in an attempt to influence the new 
revolutionary Islamist leader in Algeria.  However, the emissary was killed by Algerian security forces, providing proof that AQ 
was actively courting the Algerian jihad.132  Thus, the 2003 allegiance to Osama bin Laden and the subsequent 2006 merger of 
AQ and the GSPC, announced by Ayman al-Zawahiri, appeared as no surprise.133  The reality is that Al-Qaeda had always been 
in Algeria.134  With this historical perspective, AQIM does not appear to be a brand-new organization, formed as a new AQ 
front to the global jihad. Instead, AQ formally and informally sponsored the Algerian jihad with ideology, training, and 
financing for more than 15 years and had a part in the GIA, although it could not control it. In this context, the arrival of AQIM 
on the Algerian Islamist stage seems far less significant and can even be seen as more of a rebirth of the GIA than anything 
else—an attempt to restart the engine of takfiri jihad begun by Afghan veterans like Qari Said. From this point of view, the rise 
of GIA can be seen as the more important and more dangerous event. 
 Prior to the formation of the GIA, Algeria had not experienced 
the indiscriminate types of violence that became routine under the 
group, which introduced two forms of violence: the murder of civilians 
in the name of takfir and the killing of foreigners.  The concept of 
murder of noncombatants under takfir was justified by a GIA fatwa, 
which declared, “the populace should pick sides [either the state or the jihad] on pain of death.”135 The fatwa meant the GIA 
was no longer satisfied with neutral parties or tacit support but would view citizens as either with the GIA or against it.  
The extermination of entire villages became a common practice after this fatwa was issued.136 
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 The takiri fatwa also applied to all foreigners and foreign institutions.137  One example of the GIA acting upon 
this tenet was the hijacking of Air France Flight 8969 in 1994, with the intent to crash the fuel-laden airliner in Paris, a 
predecessor to the 9/11 plot carried out in the United States.138  Another example can be seen in the murder of seven 
French monks in Algeria.139  These types of events were not prevalent prior to the rise of the GIA, and the only 
substantially new tactic brought by AQIM was the use of suicide bombings.140  Overall, AQIM of today seems little 
changed from the GIA of the late 1990s. 
 The philosophy of Islamism within Algeria has a long historical precedent.  While the GIA provided a significant 
transformation of revolutionary Islamism in the country, AQIM can be seen as just another part of Algeria’s long history 
of Islamism. Furthermore, Islamist ideals have never been homogenous but instead vary widely from individual spiritual 
salvation to the use of violent jihad to force compliance with the tenets of Islam.  These principles can be explained 
broadly in the terms of apolitical, political, and revolutionary Islamist divisions.  Grouping Islamists into these categories 
makes it easy to see how revolutionary Islamists differ from the rest.  Even within the revolutionary Islamist groups of 
Algeria, the GIA was a clear aberration, representing something novel from traditional Algerian Islamism.  The difference 
grew from the experiences of a few Algerian fighters as mujahadeen in the Afghan jihad combined with the subsequent 
influence by the future founders of Al Qaeda.  However, because AQ has maintained a close relationship with the 
Algerian jihad throughout; the birth of AQIM can be seen as a fundamentally trivial evolution.  In fact, AQIM appears to 
be an attempt to return to the GIA, the original Algerian jihad group of 1992. Essentially, AQIM is less of an instrumental 
transformation in Islamist ideology than an insignificant name change in a chapter of Algeria’s Islamist history—a history 
of spiritual tradition, political reform, and unrestrained violence. 
-------------------------------- 
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The Moving Image 
Kalev I. Sepp 




Columbia/Red Lion, 1966 
 
There is a remarkable theme that runs through 
two movies set on different sides of the same insurgency:  
torture works.  The insurgency is the Algerian Revolt, 
1954–1962, that ended when France granted 
independence to its long-held North African colony.  The 
two movies are Battle of Algiers, directed by Gillo 
Pontecorvo and nominated for three Academy Awards, 
and Lost Command, based on the novel Les Centurions by 
French war correspondent Jean Pierre Lucien Osty, who 
wrote under the pen name Jean Lartéguy. 
Both movies ostensibly tell their stories by moving 
back and forth between the viewpoints of the insurgents 
and the counterinsurgents. Battle of Algiers is more 
convincing because of its realistic documentary style—
shadowy black-and-white scenes shot on location in 
Algiers, with former Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) 
guerrillas playing themselves in several of the roles.  Lost 
Command, shot in Spain, has the stagey, klieg-lit sheen of 
the Hollywood production it is, complete with movie 
stars—although the Basque highlands stand in well 
enough for the Atlas Mountains, where 
the FLN had its bases. 
Despite the balanced portrayal 
both movies claim to present, Algerian 
rebels are the principal characters of 
Battle of Algiers, and French paratroopers 
– les paras -- dominate Lost Command.  
Where the two coincide, in a disturbing 
way, is when the French paras interrogate 
captured and suspected insurgents.  
Physical torture is not just implied, but 
plainly depicted.  The result in both 
movies is always the same—the prisoner tells all. 
Battle of Algiers begins in small, tiled room, like a 
restaurant kitchen, with a sink and steel tables.  Broad-
shouldered paras in camouflage jackets and caps—called 
“leopard suits”—surround a slight, shivering Arab, naked 
except for undershorts.  A para colonel strides in.  “He 
came clean,” reports one of the officers.  The Arab 
suddenly bolts from his chair toward an open window.  
The paras shove him back—“Do you want another 
round?”  With pain creasing his face, he leads the paras to 
an insurgent chief’s hideout.  
The necessity of this approach to intelligence 
collection is explained by the newly arrived para colonel, 
who has been sent to Algiers to crush the terrorist 
insurgents.  Meeting with his staff, the colonel describes 
the FLN terrorist organization as a geometric pyramid of 
interconnected cells, and then announces his regiment’s 
objective:  identify the insurgent “Executive Bureau” 
(the leaders).  The method they will use, he says, will be 
interrogation, “conducted in such a way as to ensure we 
always get an answer. … In our situation, humane 
considerations can only lead to despair and confusion.” 
Soon, another scene in a dimly lit space reveals 
leopard-suited paras at the edge of a cone of light.  Next 
to a large tub of water, a shirtless Arab, his wet hair 
matted down on his forehead, gasps for air, his chest 
heaving.  As a para takes notes, the 
Arab betrays all the details of his 
insurgent unit. 
Journalists in the capital 
eventually get wind of what’s going on, 
and at a press conference, they ask 
bluntly:  Is torture being used by French 
troops?  “The word ‘torture’ isn’t used 
in our orders,” the colonel replies with 
a straight face.  He changes the 
direction of the interview.  This isn’t 
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So, according to one movie commissioned by the Algerian government and another 
scripted from the French perspective, torture works 
staying or going.  If the pieds noirs141 
(Europeans) want to stay in Algeria, they 
must accept the consequences. 
Different techniques of torture 
are portrayed.  A para turns a blowtorch 
on a man’s ribs as he hangs by his wrists.  
An Arab is trussed and hung upside down 
from a pipe.  Paras fix battery clamps to 
the earlobes of a man who writhes in 
agony as the current is applied.  Another 
captive is waterboarded. 
Many of the same incidents are 
depicted in Lost Command as a French 
paratroop regiment hunts down FLN 
guerrillas in the sandpaper countryside.  In 
a dusty village, a staff officer enters a storeroom to see an 
Arab slumped in a chair, unconscious, with a blackjack-
wielding para sergeant by his side.  A para captain in the 
room boasts they’ve learned the location of the guerrilla 
base (this, after the unit has been in town five minutes).  
The staff officer is outraged: “Torture!” he accuses.  The 
captain snaps back, “We came out here to win!” 
There are parallel scenes from Battle of Algiers in 
Lost Command.  A suspected bombmaker is arrested and 
brought to a dark cellar.  A para interrogator taps battery 
clamps together, sending sparks flying.  “And that’s nothing, 
sir—it can be made 10 times as strong.”  The para 
intelligence officer warns the suspect, “I’m going to get 
that information from you … one way or the other.”  
Another prisoner staggers in with a bruised and bloody face. 
When the French commander discovers an 
Algerian woman is a spy, a para officer slaps and beats her 
(on camera) until she passes out (off camera), but not 
before she reveals every detail about insurgent arms 
shipments and the top rebel commander.  This 
capitulation takes about three minutes.  Success comes 
                                                          
141 Literally, “black-feet,” possibly from the black boots worn by 
19th-c. French colonists. 
because the para officer shed his 
naïve notions of “rules of warfare,” 
since the enemy doesn’t play by 
them anyway. 
So, according to one movie 
commissioned by the Algerian 
government and another scripted 
from the French perspective, torture 
works. 
But did it?  How did the 
tough French paras win the battle 
for Algiers but lose the war for 
Algeria?  Part of the answer is 
operational.  By 1957, the FLN 
leaders recognized Algiers had 
become too dangerous for them and moved back into the 
hinterlands, where they continued their insurrection.  
They had not been destroyed, only beaten in one battle.  
Another explanation is that for years, the French 
government and security forces in Algeria fundamentally 
misunderstood the FLN to be a Marxist-Communist 
movement.  Although some FLN members employed 
classic Communist tactics, notably ruthless terrorism, they 
were really nationalists. 
One of the central reasons the French lost the war 
against the rebels stems from the larger ramifications of 
their use of torture.  As Dr. Hy Rothstein of the Naval 
Postgraduate School faculty has pointed out, to whatever 
degree and for whatever rationale torture was employed, 
the French public was appalled.  They lost faith in their 
government, and so the French government lost its 
legitimacy.  The people lost confidence in their Army, and 
the Army lost confidence in itself.  Unable to resolve the 
political and moral crises in Algeria, the Fourth Republic 
collapsed.  Charles de Gaulle became leader of France, and 
he soon sought a negotiated end to the rebellion. 
These “peace talks” infuriated a number of French 
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Secrète (OAS) to kill Algerian Muslims, derail the 
negotiations, and assassinate de Gaulle himself.  (This 
movement inspired Frederick Forsyth’s best-selling novel 
and acclaimed 1973 movie The Day of the Jackal, which 
both include a plot-point torture scene.)  In the end, it was 
the OAS—not the FLN—that was wiped out, and the 
Algerian revolutionaries finally gained their sought-after 
independence after a bitter, eight-year-long civil war. 
But does this mean that torture still worked?  Not 
according to then-Colonel Paul Aussaresses, who 
confessed his personal use of extrajudicial killing and 
torture in his memoir, The Battle of the Casbah:  Terrorism 
and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955–1957.  The French 
Army intelligence officer admits he gained fewer successes 
against the FLN through torture than he did through 
standard police methods, including careful analysis of 
records and files and a thorough population census.  In 
combination, these tactics illuminated the nodes and 
connections of the insurgent networks.  Patient and 
painstaking collection of information to form actionable 
intelligence is what eventually broke the FLN hold on the 
Casbah.  There was nothing in the French methods that 
overcame the inherent unreliability of information 
received from torture—the distortion of memory under 
fear and duress, and the subject’s willingness to say 
anything, particularly what he thinks his tormentors want 
to hear, to stop the pain. 
So, why would both sides—the FLN in Battle of 
Algiers and the French military in Lost Command—ascribe 
such efficacy to torture?  For the French practitioners, it 
can be explained as justification.  If this illegal method 
were employed at all, it had to be presented as wholly 
effective in all cases to vindicate the torturers.  For the 
FLN, it was necessary to emphasize, even overstate, the 
French use of torture in order to remake history.  One 
reason the FLN would choose to attribute its setbacks to 
French torture would be to conceal its own poor 
leadership, internal informants, and tactical failures. 
Another reason would be to make its own widespread 
atrocities—including terrorist bombings, murder of anti-
FLN Imams, and massacres of entire towns of Algerian 
Muslims who were French loyalists—seem less vile by 
contrast, and thus excusable. 
In their depictions of torture and by choosing to 
give torture an integral role in the storylines, Battle of 
Algiers and Lost Command are both diminished.  These 
films exaggerate the effectiveness of torture—for political 
effect on the one hand and for dramatic effect on the 
other.  Torture didn’t—and doesn’t—really work.  It is 
worth watching these movies for their cinematic qualities, 
the actors and the acting, and intriguing glimpses of 
history—the para colonel’s analysis of counterinsurgency 
metrics on a wall chart might surprise some viewers with 
its familiarity.  However, as studies of the viability of 
torture in counterinsurgency operations, there are no 




Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is senior lecturer in Defense Analysis at 
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.  He earned his 
Combat Infantryman Badge in the Salvadoran Civil War   
 
 
CALL FOR BOOK REVIEWS! 
CTX is looking to publish book reviews of anywhere between 500 and 1,000 words in length. 
Books can be on any topic generally related to the issues of terrorism, counterterrorism, and international security 
collaboration.  Reviews may also be about books written in languages other than English, however the review itself 
must be in English. 
As with all submissions, book reviews are screened for the quality of the ideas, not the technical, 
grammatical correctness.  However, please have your submissions proofread before submitting. 
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Has torture finally escaped the 
historic domain of the powerfully 
cruel and sadistic and gained 
entry into the domain of  
academic inquiry? 
Mail for George  
 
Do you have an ethical dilemma or question? Address them to George at 
CTXeditor@gmail.com. 
Ethics & Insights 
by George Lober 
 
 
Any discussion of torture in 
500 words or less is bound to fail. This 
column will be no different. But for 
the sake of clarity, let me try. 
Within the past 10 years, 
newspaper columns, magazine 
articles, academic papers, and entire 
books have been written on the 
ethics of torture. Films such as the 
1966 classic, The Battle of 
Algiers have been studied for 
the ethical questions they pose: 
were the tactics employed by 
the French military tantamount 
to torture, or were they, as the 
lieutenant colonel in the film 
suggests, merely a form of 
enhanced interrogation? Were 
the French justified in 
employing those tactics against 
Muslim detainees in order to save 
innocent French lives? 
At the heart of these written 
pieces and film studies is a 
presumption: torture has come to the 
fore as a subject worthy of ethical 
debate. But is that really the case? 
Has torture finally escaped the 
historic domain of the powerfully 
cruel and sadistic and gained entry 
into the domain of academic inquiry? 
Are there really ethics to torture: is 
there ever such a thing as good 
torture—as opposed to bad torture—
a right time to torture and a wrong 
time? 
Before answering those 
questions, let me offer a simple 
definition of what torture really is: 
torture is the purposeful and 
deliberate infliction of intense pain 
on a subject who can neither escape 
the pain nor block it. Human torture, 
like that depicted in The Battle of 
Algiers involves intense pain 
methodically inflicted on detainees 
who are unable to either defend 
themselves or escape beatings, 
simulated drownings, and the use of a 
blowtorch on bare skin. Yet, 
according to the French lieutenant 
colonel in charge of securing Algiers, 
these actions are not torture. They 
are techniques of interrogation that 
are within the bounds of the 
international charters and treaties to 
which the French government is party. 
But can changing the name of 
an act change its violent nature? Can 
an act of torture become something 
less by calling it a tactic of 
interrogation? Frankly, I think not.  At 
its core, torture is an act of brutality 
and sadism, and it is not, in my 
opinion, a subject worthy of ethical 
debate. 
However, the questions 
surrounding torture are—particularly 
torture authorized for political 
purposes. Is it ever okay to 
deliberately inflict torturous pain 
in the name of a society; and if so, 
on whom and when? What if that 
society purports to represent 
strong moral or religious values? 
Can it still make that claim after 
engaging in torture? What if an 
enemy, such as the insurgents in 
The Battle of Algiers, displays 
little regard for innocent life? Is 
torturing that enemy justifiable? 
Are there ethical costs to a society 
that engages in torture, and do 
those costs justify the gain? 
In my opinion, every 
ethically responsible society should 
debate and resolve such questions 
before ever sanctioning torture. But 
it should not kid itself about the 
ugly truth of what torture is, nor 
delude itself with a name change 
into pretending what torture is not. 
 
George Lober guides U.S. and international military students through the tricky terrain of 
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Resources:  Bibliography of Key Works on Algeria  
Mohammed M. Hafez 
If you know of a notable resource worth 
sharing with the CT community through CTX, 
send your recommendation to 
CTXEditor@gmail.com with the word 
"Resources" in the subject line. 
Books Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. A History of the Maghrib in the 
Islamic Period. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Al-Fasi, Alal. The Independence Movements in Arab North 
Africa. Ann Arbor, MI: American Council of Learned Societies, 1954. (Originally published as al-Harakat al-Istiqlaliyah fi al-Maghrib al-
Arabi, 1948).   Allouache, Merzak. Bab El-Oued: A Novel. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. Crenshaw Hutchinson, Martha. Revolutionary Terrorism: 
The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. Entelis, John P. Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986. Entelis, John P., ed. Islam, Democracy, and the State in 
North Africa. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997. Fanon, Frantz. A Dying Colonialism. New York: Grove Press, 1994. (Originally published as L'An Cinq, 
de la Révolution Algérienne, 1959). Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, 1963. (Originally published as Les 
Damnés de la Terre, 1961). Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 
Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964. 
Hafez, Mohammed M. Why Muslims Rebel: Repression 
and Resistance in the Islamic World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–
1962. Papermac, 1987. House, Jim, and Neil MacMaster. Paris 1961: Algerians, 
State Terror, and Memory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Laremont, Ricardo Rene. Islam and the Politics of 
Resistance in Algeria, 1783–1992. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2000. Malley, Robert. The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, 
Revolution, and the Turn to Islam. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996. Martinez, Luis. The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. McDougall, James. History and the Culture of Nationalism 
in Algeria. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Moore, Clement Henry. North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1970. Roberts, Hugh. The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002: 
Studies in a Broken Polity. London: Verso, 2003. Rouadjia, Ahmed. Al-Ikhwan wal-Jaami’a: Istitla’a lil-
Haraka al-Islamiyyah fi al-Jazair (The Brothers and the Mosque: An Inquiry into the Algerian Islamic Movement; originally published as Les 
Frères et la Mosquée, 1990). Beirut: Dar al-Muntakhab al-Arabi, 1993. Ruedy, John, ed. Islamism and Secularism in North Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996.  Ruedy, John. Modern Algeria: The Origins and 
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Shahin, Emad Eldin. Political Ascent: Contemporary 
Islamic Movements in North Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. Tawil, Camille. Al-Haraka al-Islamiyyah al-Musalaha fi 
al-Jazair (The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria). Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998. Tawil, Camille. Brothers in Arms: The Story of Al-Qaeda 
and the Arab Jihadists. London: Saqi Books, 2010. Quandt, William B. Revolution and Political Leadership: 
Algeria, 1954–1968. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969. Quandt, William B. Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria’s 
Transition from Authoritarianism. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998. Quwas, Mohamed. Ghazwat al-Inqadhz: Ma’araket al-
Islam as-Siyasi fi al-Jazair (The Conquest of the Islamic Salvation Front: The Battle of Political Islam in Algeria). Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1998. 
Willis, Michael. The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A 
Political History. New York: New York University Press, 1999.  
Films and Documentaries 
Algeria’s Bloody Years. Directed by Malek Bensmaïl. 2003. 
Bab el-Oued City. Directed By Merzak Allouache. 1994. 
Battle of Algiers. Directed by Gillo Pontecorvo. 1966. 
Of Gods and Men. Directed by Xavier Beauvois. 2010.  
Mohammed M. Hafez, Ph.D., is an associate professor in 
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Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) 
"Forging Partnerships for Africa's Future" 
AfricaCenter.org 
With a publicly accessible website, the Africa Center 
puts out a monthly eNewsletter, Africa Security Briefs, 
Special Reports, and academic Research Papers, such as 
the timely new piece on the grassroots evolution of the 
information environment, "Africa's Evolving Info 
Systems: A Pathway to Security and Stability".  Their 
dedicated alumni staff coordinate dozens of regional 
workshops and events throughout the year.  Go to 
AfricaCenter.org to connect. 
 
Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) 
"Fifteen Years of Education, Empowering, and 
Connecting" 
APCSSLink.org 
Open to graduates of the Asia Pacific Center and 
affiliates, APCSSLink.org  "provides a forum ... to deepen 
your understanding of security issues, maintain existing 
relationships, and develop new contacts throughout the 
Asia Pacific region."  They offer APCSS Analytical 
Reports, News Briefs, and Currents Magazine, as well as 
specific Communities of Interest for security 
professionals in the region.  Go to APCSSLink.org to 
connect. 
 
College of International Security Affairs (CISA) 
"a focal point for interagency and international security 
education" 
www.NDU.edu/CISA 
CISA is the flagship of the Combating Terrorism 
Fellowship program at the National Defense University.  
The Master's Degree program prepares military and 
civilian leaders from around the world "to better 
address national and international security challenges 
through multi-disciplinary educational programs, 
research, professional exchanges and outreach."  CISA's 
robust alumni website is available at 






Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) 
"Fighting terrorism is the ultimate civil-military 
challenge" 
www.CCMR.org 
CCMR is dedicated to strengthening democratic civil-
military relationships and assisting other nations in 
making integrated defense decisions.  "Our most 
important objective is to help them build the 
institutional capacity to fight terrorism.  All programs 
include guidance on building national-level strategies 
that can guide effective, legal, and ethical operations 
against terrorists and their networks."  CCMR will be 
publishing a book, "Fighting Back: What Governments 
Can Do About Terrorism" later this year.  Find out more, 
and go to www.CCMR.org to connect. 
 
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) 
"toward a more cooperative and stable international 
security environment" 
www.NDU.edu/CHDS 
The CHDS mission is "to develop civilian specialists in 
defense and military matters by providing graduate 
level programs in defense planning and management, 
executive leadership, civilian-military relations and 
interagency operation." 
 
Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School (DA) 
"to educate the leaders of tomorrow in the challenges of 
21st century conflict" 
www.NPS.edu 
DA's overarching missions is "to develop critical thinkers 
and capable operators, planners and commanders for 
the rigors of irregular warfare". They host joint SOF, 
conventional, and international officers and house the 
nationally prominent Information Operations Center of 
Excellence, and the CORE Lab.  More information is 
available through the Naval Postgraduate School 
website at www.nps.edu under the Graduate School of 
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Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) 
"exploring new ideas ... and acting as a catalyst for 
positive change" 
www.DIILS.org 
DIILS "is the lead defense security cooperation resource 
for professional legal education, training, and rule of 
law programs for international military and related 
civilians globally."  They also offer an alumni-only portal 
on the web.  Go to www.DIILS.org to connect. 
GCMC (George C. Marshal Center) 
"enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of 
North America, Europe and Eurasia" 
www.MarshallCenter.org 
"The legacy, goals and ideals of the Marshall Plan 
continue through the security education initiatives of 
the George C. Marshall European Center for Security 
Studies."  The Marshall Center publishes its quarterly 
"per Concordiam" covering regional security and 
defense issues, in addition to publishing its renowned 
Occasional Papers, and Security Insights.  These are 
available freely at MarshallCenter.org, where alumni 
can also connect to their exclusive online portal, 
offering additional resources. 
 
JSOU (Joint Special Operations University) 
"fostering closer relationships with SOF’s international 
partners" 
JSOU.SOCOM.mil 
JSOU's mission is "to educate Special Operations Forces 
executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 
selected other national and international security 
decision-makers, both military and civilian, through 
teaching, research, and outreach in the science and art 
of Joint Special Operations."  Read through their recent 
publications and learn more about the University at 
jsou.socom.mil 
 
NAVSCIATTS (Naval Small Craft Instruction Advanced 
Technical Training School) 
"to provide partner nation security forces with the 
highest level of riverine and coastal craft training" Go to 










National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) 
"to promote understanding of key transnational and 
geostrategic issues impacting the Intelligence 
Community" 
www.DIA.mil/College 
"...the Center for International Engagement co-hosts 
conferences and symposia on behalf of the Director, 
Defense Intelligence Agency. These events bring 
together Military Intelligence Chiefs to discuss regional 
security issues in an academic environment of non-
attribution land transparency."  Online, the NDIC offers 
unique publications on "Global Perspectives on 
Intelligence" and collaboration in the intelligence 
community, as well as insightful analyses.  Go to 
www.DIA.mil/College to connect. 
 
NESA (Near-East South Asia Center for Strategic 
Studies) 
"To enhance security in the Near East and South Asia by 
building sustained, mutually beneficial relationships..." 
NESA-Center.org 
"The NESA Center concept is based on the premise that 
Arabs and Israelis, Pakistanis and Indians and others  
would come together in a neutral setting for mutually 
beneficial dialogue about national security issues. This 
concept has proven itself strong ..."  The publicly-
accessible website offers regional news, as well as a 
comprehensive list of U.S. and international online 
resources freely available, in addition to their alumni-
only website.  Go to Nesa-Center.org to connect. 
 
PfPC CTWG (Partnership for Peace Consortium 
Combating Terrorism Working Group) 
"Strengthening democracies through knowledge" 
www.PfPConsortium.org 
"the Combating Terrorism Working Group brings 
together interested officials, security practitioners and 
academics from several countries to examine how best 
to design and apply multinational responses to current 
international terrorist threats."  The Partnership for 
Peace puts out a professional, quarterly journal, 
Connections, in addition to a number of other 
publication products.  To read their journal, go to 
www.PfPConsortium.org and connect. 
 
